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Executive Summary 
 
Overall the analysis in this paper agrees with the Adam Smith Institute in that: 
 
· There is a serious need for ongoing research and evaluation of Fair Trade (and 
indeed any poverty reduction or developmental intervention) to ensure that 
resources are not wasted in well intended yet inefficient, or, utility reducing 
strategies. 
· Fair Trade should not be accepted or promoted as, the only or the best 
consumption based strategy for alleviating poverty. There are many worthy 
certification schemes and charities that are well deserving of support. 
· The provision of appropriate incentives for producers and consumers inside a 
regime of international trade is strongly linked to incidences of economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  
 
However, our own analysis leads us to seriously question other aspects of the Adam 
Smith Report in that: 
 
1. The specific arguments against Fair Trade lack a credible basis in either 
empirical evidence or theoretical understanding because: 
· Many of them are no more than assertions bereft of any attempt to cite 
evidence. 
· While some points do reference appropriately rigorous academic and 
institut ional research, other evidence is of a lower and arguably 
insufficient standard of credibility. 
 
2. There is a lack of cohesion as many of the criticisms of Fair Trade contradict 
the suggestion that patronage is allocated to other mechanisms instead. 
 
3. Any idea of positive benefit from Fair Trade governance remains unexplored. 
 
4. The lack of sophistication extends to the evidence cited in support of the 
argument that universal liberalisation is the best way to reduce poverty. 
 
Ultimately it is suggested that the Adam Smith report: 
 
· Fails to establish suitable grounds for the rejection of Fair Trade. 
· Fails to establish an appropriately credible case in favour of trade 
liberalisation. 
· Fails to take an appropriately rigorous attitude to the evaluation of what are 
incredibly important issues.  
 
In place of the approach taken in the Adam Smith report this analysis suggests that:  
 
1. The cases of China, India and Hong Kong show that it is the appropriate 
management of local economies in their interaction with the wider world that 
is the best way to reduce poverty. Far from universal liberalisation this has 
often included the active management of price incentives as well as direct 
investment to build the capabilities of local business and the poor.  
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2. Financially poor actors should not always be expected to voluntarily respond 
to market incentives because: 
· The developing world is characterised by levels of risk and instability that 
can make long term planning difficult to carry out. 
· By definition the poor lack the capabilities necessary to meet the 
immediate and longer term costs of diversification into more beneficial 
incomes strategies. 
· The developing world often lacks the market incentive structures necessary 
to promote the structural change that might be necessary to reduce poverty.  
 
3. Poor commodity producers are likely to be assisted in their effort to make the 
necessary diversification decisions through the provision of: 
· Prices that cover the cost of sustainable production for as much output as 
possible, with the aim of reducing immediate levels of poverty and 
building the capabilities of those unable to benefit from market discipline. 
· Long term contracts that offer a more stable environment in which to make 
decisions about the diversification of income strategies. 
· The payment of upfront credit and an additional social premium to build 
capabilities which can be used to facilitate diversification.  
 
Ultimately it is concluded that: 
 
· The case against Fair Trade is not strong enough to recommend a rejection of 
such a well established mechanism which is empirically proven to help with 
the reduction of poverty in a significant number of cases. 
· The management of market incentives systems cannot be rejected wholesale, 
but instead individual strategies must be evaluated on the specifics of 
individual cases and contexts. This applies equally to state intervention and the 
Fair Trade minimum prices. 
· The most appropriate response to criticisms of Fair Trade is to continue a 
broad based program of research with the aim of making recommendations for 
reform of the governance mechanisms.  
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Definitions 
 
Fair Trade  
 
This is the general Umbrella term for a regime of private governance that seeks to ensure 
that producers in the developing world receive a beneficial return for production and 
trade. The definition of the term has been summarised in that: 
 
‘Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that 
seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by 
offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers 
and workers - especially in the global south. Fair Trade organisations (backed by 
consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, raising awareness and in 
campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade’1. 
 
Fairtrade  
 
This is a specific term that represents the certification of products under the guidelines of 
the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO). This certification claims that 
products have been produced and traded under certain social, economic and 
environmental criteria. Some regulations are that northern buyers: 
· Pay a price to producers  that aims to cover the costs of sustainable production 
and living;  
· Pay a 'social premium' that producer communities can invest in development 
social or business development  
· Make partial advance payments of up to 60% of the final sale price when 
requested by producers to fund production   
· Sign contracts that allow for long-term planning and sustainable production 
practices. 
FLO certification requires products to satisfy two categories of standards: 1) a Generic 
Standard which lays out the conditions to be met by the producer organisation, and 2) a 
Product Specific Standard, which summarises the conditions of the trade relationship 
between the producer and northern buyer. Standards are available for: 1) small farmers’ 
organisations or ‘those that are not structurally dependent on permanent hired labour2, and 
2) hired labour contexts that are structurally dependent on hiring waged labour.  
To make differentiation easier, the concepts have been delineated by the use of the term 
FLO Fairtrade certified to represent this second case. 
 
                                                 
 
1 This is the definition agreed by FINE an umbrella group of major players in the fair trade movement. 
These include: Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), International Federation for 
Alternative Trade (IFAT), Network of European World shops (NEWS!), and European Fair Trade 
Association (EFTA). 
2 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2007d. Generic Fairtrade Standards for Small 
Farmers' Organizations. FLO.  
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Diversification3 
Diversification is defined here as an adjustment of farm enterprise patterns to increase 
farm incomes, or to reduce income vulnerability. Thus, diversification here means (i) a 
larger mix of diverse and complementary activities within agriculture; (ii) a movement of 
resources from low value agriculture to high value agriculture; and (iii) a shift of 
resources from farm to non-farm activities.  
 
Such changes to traditional forms of agriculture can be pathways out of poverty, because 
they contribute to increasing rural incomes and employment opportunities. 
 
 
                                                 
 
3 This definition has been taken from: Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007. Diversification into Horticulture 
and Poverty Reduction: A Research Agenda. World Development 35(8). 
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Introduction: Out with the fair and in with the free? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
On Monday 25th of February 2008 the Adam Smith Institute published Unfair Trade4. 
This report took the context of Fairtrade Fortnight as an opportunity to criticise the 
Fair Trade movement for being keen to aggressively promote their brand but being 
slow to ask critical questions. According to Marc Sidwell, the author of the report, 
two important questions need to be answered: why are the world’s commodity 
producers poor in the first place and, more importantly for the Adam Smith Institute, is 
paying them a minimum price actually the best way to relieve the ir plight? 5. Naturally, 
the report offered its own answers to these questions with the overall conclusion being 
that: ‘The evidence is clear: Fair Trade is unfair, but free trade makes you rich’ 6. So, 
should we have turned down the free-of-charge Fairtrade certified samples in the town 
hall? Is it in fact the case that Fair Trade is unfair?  
 
The conclusion of the research and analysis presented here is that the evidence is far from 
‘clear’ in supporting the argument that Fair Trade is ‘unfair’, or that reducing poverty is 
as simple as reducing trade tariffs. This suggestion is presented by building the argument 
in five parts. The first draws attention to the aims of the Adam Smith Report in offering a 
commentary on Fair Trade , and explores the methodology that Marc Sidwell has used to 
arrive at his conclusions.  Far from trying to evaluate Fair Trade on its merits and 
problems, it appears evident that the report simply compiles as many criticisms as 
possible without any serious consideration of the potential benefits. This naturally makes 
for an extremely bia sed approach and an effort to balance this one-sided view has been a 
strong motivation in developing the work presented below. 
 
As part of this work the material offered by Sidwell has been examined in Part Two. Far 
from the case being ‘clear’ it emerges that many of Sidwell’s arguments rest on little or 
no evidence, and where support is cited, sources tend to lack the rigour necessary to back 
                                                 
 
4 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute 
http://www.adamsmith.org/images/pdf/unfair_trade.pdf 
5 Ibid., p. 6 
6 Ibid., p. 3 
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such strong claims. Many of the arguments are thinly substantia ted with citations , and 
where evidence is offered, critical investigation reveals that some of the sources fail 
outright to prove the points that they supposedly support. 
Part Three discusses the idea that free trade is the best route to poverty reduction. 
While Sidwell argues that contemporary examples prove universal liberalisation to be 
a preferable policy to market regulation, analysis  here concludes that this is a very 
simple reading of the evidence. An alternative reading of the cases cited by Sidwell is 
that the best way to promote growth and reduce poverty is in fact through the 
appropriately managed interaction of local economies with the wider world. It is 
suggested that this management is most likely to be successful when grounded in an 
awareness of the capabilities of local business and enterprise. In this light, 
liberalisation only leads to beneficial effects if local actors are sufficiently capable of 
taking advantage of market discipline. Where this is not the case, there is significant 
evidence to suggest that in place of universal liberalisation, governments should 
actively manage incentive structures and invest in resources that facilitate the 
strengthening of local business capabilities.  
After questioning Sidwell’s arguments, Part Four deve lops an alternative framework with 
which to think about the effectiveness of Fair Trade in meeting its aims. It is suggested 
that far from retarding processes that allow producers to capture more value, Fair Trade 
can actually be seen to contribute to these important changes in economic structure by 
building the capability of local enterprise. 
 
While Sidwell argues that producers should be left to voluntarily seize market 
opportunities7, wider evidence suggests that this is not a realistic  expectation. This is 
because although the poor are capable of recognising incentives which promote 
diversification, structural constrain ts often mean that this course of action is not carried 
out.  This is for several reasons: firstly, it should be considered that large parts of the 
(rural) developing world are characterised by instability and omnipresent risk of various 
shocks to welfare. This means that the broad environment is not conducive to undertaking 
the sort of long term planning necessary for diversification. Secondly, the poor by 
                                                 
 
7 Ibid., p. 5 
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definition simply lack the financial8, physical9, human10 and social11 capital necessary to 
operationalise decisions based on price incentives. Finally, an inability to make accurate 
predictions about the returns from new income strategies adds even more trepidation 
when considering diversification which will theoretically return more value and raise 
standards of living. Ultimately, it is likely that the only rational course of action for 
marginalised producers working inside market systems is to remain in the low value 
sectors and hope for the best. In the light of these micro-realities then, this alternative 
approach goes some way to understand why agricultural producers in the developing 
world might be poor in the first place. 
 
The final section of the paper builds on this framework to argue that when these micro 
realities are accounted for , it appears less easy to dismiss Fair Trade and the payment of 
minimum prices as poverty relief strategies. This paper does not seek to argue that Fair 
Trade is perfect, a panacea for deprivation or should be given a monopoly over other 
consumption based poverty reduction strategies. What is suggested is that far from 
automatically retarding processes of economic diversification, Fair Trade can help 
provide producers with the stability and resources necessary to carry out diversification of 
income/production strategies. For this reason, the  ultimate conclusion of this paper is that 
while there might be grounds to recommend a program of gradual reform for Fair Trade 12, 
consumers do not need to divert patronage away from Fair Trade. 
                                                 
 
8 Income, savings and credit. 
9 Physical infrastructure necessary for life and business, such as shelter, tools, equipment, machinery 
etc. 
10 Knowledge, qualifications, training, skills and experience.  
11 While this has proved a dynamic term the meaning here refers to associations with other individuals 
or networks of people, characterised by varying degrees of trust. 
12 It should be noted that we have not included all the specific conclusions of our analysis in this paper. 
Fair Trade in its current embodiment is not perfect, and while existing knowledge should provide 
impetus for more immediate reform in some areas, on going research is certainly needed to understand 
many of these issues in mo re detail. We intend to publish further conclusions when they are more 
adequately developed. 
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Part One 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
A Word on Methodology: Conclusive or questionable? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The first and perhaps most fundamental issue at stake in this discussion is one of 
methodology. Indeed, Sidwell presents us with the issue himself when he notes that: 
 
‘Explosive growth in the [Fair Trade] sector runs ahead of our ability to assess any 
unintentional consequences or the nature of any benefits provided by Fairtrade’13. 
 
This is indeed a valid concern given the way that Fair Trade is promoted in spaces of 
private consumption, and perhaps more importantly, when it is considered how 
aggressively certain actors are promoting Fair Trade to public institutions 14. It is true that 
the development of Fair Trade, or any poverty reduction strategy, must be constantly 
evaluated by independent research and assessment15. However, where such work seeks to 
make policy suggestions, it is essential that it follows an appropriately rigorous method in 
reaching its conclusions.  
 
As Sidwell notes, the efforts to evaluate Fair Trade are not yet at a stage when claims can 
be made with great certainty16. As well as the volume of evidence available, Sidwell 
criticises the type of material used by the Fair Trade movement for being ‘anecdotal17. 
This is arguably a value laden term for evidence that academic lexicon would otherwise 
describe as ‘case study’ evidence. While this evidence should certainly be subject to 
critical understanding, this methodology cannot be simply dismissed with value 
terminology.  
 
                                                 
 
13 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 8 
14 Smith. Forthcoming. The Fair Trade Revolution: the battle to define the best route to “sustainable 
development [Online].  Available at: 
http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/brassresources/04BRASS_Comment_and_Analysis.html [Accessed:   
15 It should be noted that this is a widely held view, both in wider discourse and the Fair Trade 
community itself. See: Maseland and de Vaal 2002. How Fair is Fair Trade. De Economist 150(3); Rice 
2003. Fair Trade: A More Accurate Assessment.  
16 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 8 
17 Ibid.  
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Many view case study evidence as an essential complement to the statistical studies 
that Sidwell explicitly endorses, and argue that far too often numbers are taken to 
explain more than they are able. While numerical work can highlight correlation to a 
considerable degree of accuracy, this should never be interpreted as offering causal 
relations 18. Instead, once a hypothesis has been determined, qualitative (and often case 
study) work is needed to flesh out the understanding of what caused what. Statistical 
evidence is also very useful in generalising back from specific case studies as these 
are clearly only ever evidence of the specific example that they represent (a point 
taken up below in the discussion of Sidwell’s treatment of China and India). While 
statistical evidence would be highly valuable in understanding Fair Trade better, it 
must not be used in isolation from more detailed case work which cannot be labelled 
as ‘anecdotal’ and dismissed.  
However, despite identifying the shortcomings of the available evidence, and arguing 
that it is inadequate, Sidwell then concludes that ‘the evidence is clear’19 in backing 
his position that ‘Fair Trade is in fact ‘unfair ’, and that ‘free trade makes you rich’ 20. 
This suggests a lack of cohesion in the arguments presented against Fair Trade and 
has prompted us to ask further questions of the methodology that was used to arrive at 
such a conclusion. 
In this light it is important to consider the original aim of the Adam Smith report, and 
it is illustrative to take into account the overall position of the Institute itself. A brief 
look at the think tank’s website21 reveals that the institute is specifically designed to 
promote social policies based in free market economic theory. This means that the 
initial aim of the report was to compliment the overall agenda on how free markets 
can contribute to reducing poverty and promote processes of sustainable development. 
For this reason it becomes hard to accept Sidwell’s statement that he has conducted a 
‘dispassionate analysis’22. 
                                                 
 
18 The most basic introduction to research methodology will include the essential difference between 
correlation and causation. See for example: Bernard 2000. Social Resource Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches. London: Sage Publications Inc. pp. 558-561 
19 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 3 
20 Ibid. 
21 See: Adamsmith.org 
22 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 14 
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This might well explain why, in contrast to other analytical approaches to Fair Trade, 
there is no section that discusses the  positive impacts in any detail. While the report does 
not deny that Fair Trade has produced benefits in the developing world, no time is given 
to a consideration of these issues. Instead, the report consists entirely of critic isms, and 
this leads to a very disjointed picture. This certainly appears to be the case when 
criticisms of Fair Trade are compared to some of the policy alternatives that are suggested 
as more appropriate strategies (see Part Two). 
  
A further problem with the report is that it often fails to cite evidence for the arguments 
that it makes, and where evidence is cited, much of what is referenced does not stand up 
to critical analysis. References to opinion blogs appear between citations to more rigorous 
academic and institutional studies. The difference is that where academic articles, and to 
some extent institutional studies, undergo a process of peer review and audit, web 
postings are not subject to the same appraisal before being injected into public spaces as 
knowledge. There are also instances where standardised referencing techniques have been 
used incorrectly resulting in the misrepresentation of some sources.  This provides a 
misleading impression for those unable to check the validity of the citations, and is thus 
arguably, an extremely inappropriate approach to the generation of knowledge for public 
consumption23 (For examples see: Appendix One on page 72). 
  
In summary, it appears that the Adam Smith report, Unfair Trade, did meet its aims in 
promoting the use of liberal theory to solve social problems. However, this does not 
mean that it conducted either an appropriate evaluation of the effectiveness of Fair 
Trade or appropriately justified the suggestion that free markets are a preferable 
alternative approach. Based on the above concerns this paper conducts a point by 
point rethink of many of the arguments made by Sidwell, and it is hoped that those 
who are interested can use this discussion alongside the previous work in reaching 
their own conclusions. 
                                                 
 
23 This is particularly important because one interpretation of ‘truth’ in today’s society is based on the 
idea of ‘hermeneutical cycles’. This theory suggests that what is taken to be ‘true’ emerges from a 
series of interlinked sets of knowledge, in many cases embodied in textual form. Where authors do not 
exercise responsibility in grounding written texts in suitable standards of evidence, ‘truth’ moves from 
the category of subjective interpretation, even more firmly into that of simple opinion. This, in our 
mind, is not an appropriate way to construct knowledge of any type, especially that which seeks to 
influences individual action and institutional policy.   
 
 
 
14 
Part Two 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Is Fair Trade the Only Charity that Does Not Deserve 
Patronage? A point by point rethink 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In his report for the Adam Smith Institute, the author asserts that Fair Trade is not the 
trade based poverty alleviation and development strategy that the movement claims. 
Instead, it is argued that Fair Trade is an inefficient and unsustainable system of 
charitable donation24. While conceding that there have been positive impacts (although 
spending no time on considered discussion), the report says that these have been limited 
to ‘a select few’ of lucky producers25. In place of buying Fair Trade it is suggested that 
consumers support other initiatives which, instead of paying minimum prices, undertake 
more efficient resource transfers. These strategies, it is argued, will then assist producers 
to compete in free markets, which should appear from universal liberalisation, the other 
policy recommendation suggested by the article.  
However, the analysis here suggests that the Adam Smith report does not offer 
adequate evidence in justifying its criticisms of Fair Trade, nor the alternative policy 
suggestions that are put forward. This is a point that appears to be well illustrated 
when critical questions are asked of the individual arguments posted:  
 
Is Fair Trade Unsustainable? 
Although Sidwell concedes that Fair Trade helps insure producers against price volatility 
through the provision of a minimum price26, he argues that this is an unsustainable system 
given its reliance on the voluntary action of northern consumers. He writes:  
‘The risk of compassion fatigue or of the public discovering a more effective form of 
charitable giving and diverting their Fairtrade spending accordingly remains. To say that 
‘Green has become the new Black’ is to acknowledge that Fairtrade sales are currently 
riding on a wave of fashion. It is, of course, in the nature of fashion to change rapidly… 
                                                 
 
24 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 24 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid., p. 16 Note that this omitted factor is perhaps one of the most important merits of the Fair Trade 
system; an argument that is explored in more detail in Part Four. 
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The instability of a licensing mark that trades so heavily on a trustworthy reputation is 
real. The immediate risk of a global economic downturn also presents the prospect of 
wealthy westerners choosing to cut back on premium, Fairtrade products’27. 
 
 
That the success of Fair Trade, and thus benefit to producers is based on the ability and 
desire of northern consumers to buy Fair Trade products seems self evident. However, the 
problem in Sidwell’s position is that if Fair Trade is inadequate because it is 
unsustainable on the basis of its voluntary nature, then other charities (such as 
Grameenphone, Kiva etc) and certification schemes (like Rain Forest Alliance and Utz) 
preferred by Sidwell, are equally vulnerable and unsustainable. Even the wider argument 
that trade is the best means of increasing incomes and reducing poverty comes up against 
the same problem. The purchase of all goods is reliant on both the economic capabilities 
of consumers to afford them, as well as their fashion contingent desires to purchase 
them28.  
  
Does Fair Trade Deprive Worthier Certification Schemes?  
 
Sidwell argues that the purchase of Fair Trade goods competes with both alternative 
certification schemes and ‘other forms of charitable giving’ 29. We, however, find this a 
difficult argument to substantiate. 
 
While the Fair Trade market has been growing rapidly in the last decades, sales of Utz, 
Rainforest Alliance and other certified brands of coffee, and other goods , have also been 
on the increase30. While it might be possible to argue that more of the other certifications  
would have been sold had it not been for the presence of Fair Trade, this counterfactual 
point is clearly impossible to support empirically.  
 
An alternative hypothesis might be that the promotional work on the issues of poverty and 
development might have actually benefited other brands and certifications. This is 
                                                 
 
27 Ibid., pp. 16-17 
28 Yeoman and McMahon-Beattie 2006. Luxury markets and premium pricing. Journal of Revenue and 
Pricing Management 4 
29 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 7 
30 Agritrade. Coffee: Executive brief [Online].  Available at: 
http://agritrade.cta.int/en/commodities/coffee_sector/executive_brief [Accessed: 03/03/08]; Guardian. 
2007. McCoffees help fuel ethical trade boom [Online].  Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/oct/05/ethicalbusiness.money [Accessed: 03/03/08]. 
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certainly the view advanced by market analysis that has sort to account for the growth of 
ethical consumerism31.  
This point might also be applicable to a discussion of Fair Trade school materials. 
While Sidwell argues that children are indoctrinated into buying Fair Trade, more 
holistic analysis suggests an alternative conclusion. Whilst it is important to consider 
the degree to which material used in the National Curriculum directly advocates the 
purchase of Fair Trade, the content and wording needs to be considered in more 
detail. It is true that Fairtrade material advocates the only way to guarantee Fair 
Trade, is to buy the FLO Fairtrade label. The material does not say that the only way 
to relieve poverty, is to buy Fairtrade. This is an important distinction that appears to 
have been missed. Based on the Fairtrade Foundation’s description of a Fair Trade 
school, it can be noted that: ‘It helps young people understand about how trade works 
and how to make global trade fairer. It sells and uses Fairtrade products as far as 
possible, and takes action for Fairtrade in the school and local community32.  
While it cannot be denied that there is an emphasis on FLO Fairtrade certification, it 
needs to be noted that the majority of the material, and time spent during these programs, 
highlights broader issues. For example , the fact that many people in the world do not 
enjoy the same standards of living that others take for granted. This is clearly an 
important awareness raising effort for children – and adults – who are unlikely to think 
extensively outside their own experience without stimuli33. The other important element 
highlighted by the materials is that situations of poverty cannot be blamed on the 
individuals , but are the effects of structural constrains on their ability to improve their 
lives34. This is an essential point of which the young, and commentators alike, need to 
acknowledge if they are to have meaningful thoughts about development efforts. This is a 
point which will be elaborated further in the section: The Importance of Micro Realities: 
An alternative theory with which to consider Fair Trade, on page 46. 
                                                 
 
31 Strong 1996b. Features contributing to the growth of ethical consumerism – a preliminary 
investigation. Marketing Intelligence & Planning  14(5). p. 6 
32 Fairtrade Foundation Fair Trade School Action Plan . Fairtrade Foundation  
33 For an examples of how such marketing can influence public thinking on important issues such as 
environmental sustainability see: Jackson 2004. Motivating sustainable consumption: a review of 
evidence on consumer behaviour and behavioural change.   
34 For proof that promotion of FLO Fairtrade certified goods is a limited aspect of these school 
programs see the material suggested by Sidwell and also that downloadable from Traidcraft: 
http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/publications_and_resources/school_resources.htm  
Specifically for the idea that the poor are subject to structural constrains see the Orange Game. 
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A final issue is that despite an important role for all certification labels in raising 
awareness, it remains that some standards are likely to be more beneficial than others. 
While it is not possible to comment on empirical impact, observations have been made on 
the content of the criteria demanded by different schemes. According to Murry and 
Raynolds , Rainforest Alliance’s banana certification was conceived as a ‘“conservation 
certification” program, with only secondary concern for social justice issues’35. This they 
feel this is substantiated in that ‘the only principles referring to social conditions 
suggested rather vaguely that producers must “ensure fair treatment and good conditions  
for workers and must maintain good community relations”’36. This is in contrast to the 
much more extensive list of obligations contained in FLO regulation37. Utz certification 
has also been criticised on its commitment to environmental issues38, and analysis  cited 
below suggests that it may also lack the strength of FLO-Fairtrade standards in promoting 
education39.  
 
This emerging picture (quite contrary to the point offered by Sidwell) is further supported 
by the only available cross-certification comparison (which has been encountered)40. 
Working specifically in the area of coffee, this work shows that Fairtrade regulations have 
the greatest commitment to social standards in upholding more conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation (10, in comparison to 8 by Utz and only ‘key’ 
conventions in the case of Rainforest Alliance)41, and possessing a more democratic 
structure, being open to producer stakeholders. Organic certification was found to be the 
most environmentally rigorous. In contrast, while Utz and Rain Forest Alliance 
certification schemes were praised in promoting the ‘laudable goal’ of upholding 
‘minimum requirements’, it was concluded that, ‘private certifications can and should do 
                                                 
 
35 Murray and Reynolds 2000. Alternative trade in bananas: Obstacles and opportunities for progressive 
social change in the global economy. Agriculture and Human Values 17(1). p. 70 
36 Ibid. 
37 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2005b. Generic Fair Trade Standards for Hired 
Labour. ; Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2005c. Generic Fair Trade Standards for 
Small Farmers' Organisations.  
38 Conroy Branded!: How the Certification Revolution' is Transforming Global Corporations. New 
Society Publishers. 
39 Analysis of standards in the area of promoting education of workers children has found that FLO 
standards for Hired Labour should be considered ‘stronger’ that equivalent Utz requirements. See page 
78.  
40 Raynolds, et al. 2007. Regulating sustainability in the coffee sector: A comparative analysis of third-
party environmental and social certification initiatives. Agriculture and Human Values 24(2). 
41 Ibid. See table on p. 155. 
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more’42. It can also be noted that Fairtrade regulations were also found to provide the 
highest economic return: a point discussed later in the paper43. 
 
Does Fair Trade Deprive Other Charities? 
 
Despite Sidwell’s claim, there is no empirical evidence that those who buy Fair Trade 
products make conscious or unconscious  decisions to then reduce the amount of money 
donated to charity.  
 
In fact, in considering the empirical evidence on charity giving in the UK, it is 
discovered that there is no indication that charity giving has declined with the rise of 
Fair Trade. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations, which has been 
researching charitable giving since Fair Trade entered UK markets, shows that despite 
fluctuations in the patterns of giving, overall trajectories have remained constant 44. 
Again there is the argument that giving would have been higher if Fair Trade had not 
developed, but there is clearly no evidence to corroborate this argument. On the 
contrary, statistics show that donation to overseas causes tend to cluster: those who 
support one overseas cause are most likely to give to the others45. Thus, an alternative 
position might be that those who have supported Fair Trade as one overseas ‘charity’, 
are also likely to have given to similar causes.  
 
Is Fair Trade Charity?  
 
Sidwell takes the position that far from being a trade based mechanism of poverty relief, 
Fair Trade is a form of charity donation. However,  this view is only sustainable under a 
simple analytical framework; instead we suggest a more nuanced way of interpreting the 
issue.  
 
                                                 
 
42 Ibid. pp. 159-160 
43 See the discussion of under the heading: Minimum Prices as a Stabiliser, in Part Four. 
44 National Council for Voluntary Organisations. 2008. Survey of charitable giving shows UK donors 
gave £8.9 billion in 2005 [Online].  Available at: http://www.ncvo-
vol.org.uk/research/index.asp?id=7662 [Accessed: 09/03/08]. 
45 Ibid. 
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The first important point is that the practical operation of Fair Trade is far removed from 
that of a charity. When consumers buy FLO Fairtrade certified items they are not 
donating to a central pool of resources that are then distributed out to those ‘in need’. 
Instead, consumers are paying a price for a final consumable made up of both physically 
and socia lly constructed attributes. The money paid is remunerated to those people 
involved throughout the production chain to cover the cost of their inputs, and make a 
profit for their efforts. In this way, it is difficult to conceptualise that the Fair Trade model 
as anything other than trade, nor that it operates differently to the Utz certification 
preferred by Sidwell. 
 
No money is paid by the consumer directly to ‘Fair Trade’ or the institutions that 
administer its existence – for example the FLO or the Fairtrade Foundation. Instead, 
money remitted back to producers to cover the sustainable cost of production is invested 
by them in Fairtrade certification as part of their business overheads. This expense is 
considered as an investment as the cost is accompanied with the expectation of receiving 
a higher return, just as investment might be made in other systems of quality assurance. If 
producers did not view this as a ratio nal business decision, they would simply not renew 
their certification.  
 
However, can it be argued that consumers only pay additional costs for Fair Trade out of 
charitable motivation? First it is necessary to consider that the original point behind the 
concept of Fair Trade was to offer a different option to charity donation as it did not seek 
to motivate northern populations to carry out resource transfer on the basis of moral 
consciousness alone. Instead, the whole idea was to ensure that producers were paid a 
price that covers the sustainable cost of production for goods that constituted everyday 
purchases for consumers in the north46. The implication of this is that as well as a moral 
return, northern consumers also get a cup of coffee or box of bananas for their money. 
This was the whole point of developing a certification mark which could be adopted by 
mainstream retailers47.  
                                                 
 
46 This is an opinion that arises in public interviews conducted for the film Bitter Aftertaste. See: 
www.worldwriter.org.uk/(Imhof and Lee 2007)bitter/  
47 Indeed, the brand approach which relied on a small group of dedicated and knowledgeable 
consumers buying through church congregations and specialist shops, was only having a limited 
success. For an account of the development of Fair Trade certification, marking and branding see: Low 
and Davenport 2005. Has the medium (roast) become the message?: The ethics of marketing fair trade 
in the mainstream. International Marketing Review 22(5); Nicholls and Opal 2005. Fair trade : market-
driven ethical consumption . London: Sage. For a discussion of the differences between brand and 
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There is also a strong alternative argument to the idea that Fair Trade is charity giving in 
the supermarket. It is true that price, taste, texture and nutritional value of any food are 
important to individual consumption decisions , and this is still the case with those who 
actively buy Fair Trade 48. However, reference to marketing literature shows that these 
physical qualities are not the only factors involved in making choices. Instead, at all 
levels of financial capability, consumers consider a variety of different factors in 
assessing the quality of a purchase49, and while some of these are intrinsic to the products 
themselves50, many are concerned with the conditions of production and trade 51, or even 
more remote associations such as place of purchase 52. Indeed, some empirical work has 
concluded that consumers might actually value external association more than physical 
qualities53. Based on this more developed understanding of consumer behaviour, Golding 
and Peattie have argued that Fair Trade certification is not considered an external charity 
aspect, but just as much part of a purchase as the physical qualities of the item itself54. 
Taking this into account, alongside the more detailed understanding of how Fair Trade 
operates, it becomes difficult to see how Fa ir Trade can be seen as charity.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
certification assurance see: Tran-Nguyen and Zampetti 2004. Trade and Gender, Opportunities and 
Challenges for Developing Countries. United Nations, p. 391 
48 Carrigan and Attala 2001. The Myth of the Ethical Consumer - Do Ethics Really Matter in Purchase 
Behaviour? . Journal of Consumer Marketing 18(7); Kirsty Golding 2005. In search of a golden blend: 
perspectives on the marketing of fair trade coffee. Sustainable Development 13(3). p. 158; Shaw, et al. 
2006. Fashion Victim: The Impact of Fair Trade Concerns on Clothing Choice. Journal of Strategic 
Marketing 14(4). 
49 For a summary see:  Zeithaml 1988. Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-
End Model and Synthesis of Evidence. Journal of Marketing 52(3). 
50 Morgan and Morley 2007. Making Provenance Pay: The Local Food Challenge in Shetland . Cardiff: 
School of City and Regional Planning. Cardiff University; Morgan and Sonnino 2007. Empowering 
consumers: the creative procurement of school meals in Italy and the UK. International Journal of 
Consumer Studies 31(1). 
51 Bird and Hughes 1997. Ethical Consumerism: The Case Of "Fairly-Traded" Coffee. Business Ethics: 
A European Review 6(3); Elliot and Freeman. 2001. White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights 
Activists in the Global Economy. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)  Working Paper No. 
8102; Pelsmacker, et al. 2005. Do Consumers Care about Ethics? Willingness to Pay for Fair-Trade 
Coffee. Journal of Consumer Affairs 39(2); Strong 1996a. Features contributing to the growth of 
ethical consumerism - a preliminary investigation. Marketing Intelligence & Planning  14 
52 For the case of coffee see: Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001. Who Gains from  Product Rents as the Coffee 
Market becomes more Differentiated? A Value Chain Analysis. IDS Bulletin Paper (Forthcoming)  
53 Zeithaml 1988. Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and 
Synthesis of Evidence. Journal of Marketing  52(3). 
54 Kirsty Golding 2005. In search of a golden blend: perspectives on the marketing of fair trade coffee. 
Sustainable Development 13(3). p. 157 
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Does Fair Trade Only Help a ‘Select Few’? 
 
Another reason that Fair Trade should be rejected, according to Sidwell, is that it only 
helps ‘a select few at the expense of others’55. In considering the validity of this stance it 
is first necessary to note that some of what Sidwell alleges is categorically incorrect; 
specifically when it is stated that: ‘Fairtrade not only disregards the poorest, it makes their 
condition worse by requiring that certified farms do not hire permanent full-time 
employees56. 
It is true that the FLO standards that govern Small Farmers’ Organisations do only 
apply to those ‘not structurally dependent on permanent  hired labour’57. However, the 
situation is not as black and white as Sidwell states, and in fact, these standards do 
allow for the extensive hiring of wage labour. Under the Small Farmers’ Standard it is 
possible to produce up to 49 % of output from hired labour58. Further to this, there are 
separate standards available for the certification of production that is structurally 
dependent on hiring waged labour 59. Even though this certification is not available for 
all product categories60 the idea that Fair Trade prohibits the use of wage workers is 
simply incorrect.  
Another argument raised is that Fair Trade excludes the poorest members of society. 
While such a claim sounds damning, it is certainly necessary to place this in context. The 
reality is that a significant amount of evidence suggests that in fact almost no poverty 
reduction or development strategy is actually successful in assisting those most in need61.  
 
                                                 
 
55 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 24 
56 Ibid., p. 15 
57 Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International. 2007a. Generic Fair Trade Standards for Small 
Farmers' Organisations. Article: 1.2. 
58 The standard states that, ‘Of every Fairtrade-certified product sold by the organization, more than 
50% of the volume must be produced by small producers’. See: Ibid.Article: 1.2.1.2. 
59 Although all 17 Products Standards can be issued to Small Farmers’ Organisations, only 7 are 
available to the hire labour context. These are: Bananas, Fresh Fruit (except banana), Fruit Juices, Tea, 
Wine grapes, Flowers and Plants, and Sport Balls . 
60 Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International 2007b. List of Generic Standards, Explanatory 
Documents, and Guidelines.  
61 Johnston 1996. The State and Development: An Analysis of Agricultural Policy in Lesotho, 1970-
1993. Journal of Southern African Studies 22(1); Matin and Hulme 2003. Programs for the Poorest: 
Learning from the IGVGD Program in Bangladesh. World Development 31(3); Smith, et al. 2001. 
Livelihood diversification in Uganda: patterns and determinants of change across two rural districts. 
Food Policy 26(4). Wolff and de-Shalit 2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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While it is true that microfinance (proposed as a more suitable alternative) has proved 
very competent at extending credit services to those who would otherwise have gone 
without62, much evidence suggests that the poorest are still excluded63. Just as 
mainstream banks do not see the poor as a credible debtor group – i.e. unlikely to 
return the money and instead to default – communities tend to have the same 
conception of those that they consider ‘poor’. In this sense, the very poor lack not only 
the material capabilities to take out loans (by providing fixed capital as insurance), but 
also the social capital necessary to be involved in peer- insured lending schemes. JJ. 
Morduch, an internationally recognised expert in micro-credit comments that: 
 
‘Microfinance has proven to be an effective and powerful tool for poverty reduction. Like 
many other development tools, however, it has insufficiently penetrated the poorer strata 
of society. The poorest form the vast majority of those without access to primary health 
care and basic education; similarly, they are the majority of those without access to 
microfinance’64. 
 
It would clearly be wrong to discourage the development of microfinance based on 
this point, and instead reform and improvement is clearly a more appropriate path65. 
In the same light, criticism does not adequately justify the idea that ‘the shrewd 
consumer’66 should not support Fair Trade either. In fact, if access to credit is an 
appropriate poverty reduction and development strategy, supporting Fair Trade is 
certainly beneficial given its emphasis on up front credit (see section: The Provision 
of Credit, on page 59) and inputs of resources to establish credit unions (see: The 
Social Premium, page 64).  
 
                                                 
 
62 Most celebrated of all is the evidence is that shows, in some cases, micro-credit has made significant 
and positive impact on the lives of the disenfranchised and particularly women. See: Goldberg 2005. 
Measuring the Impact of Microfinance: Taking Stock of What We Know. Grameen Foundation 
63 Linda 1999. Questioning virtuous spirals: micro-finance and women's empowerment in Africa. 
Journal of International Development 11(7). pp. 964-965 
64 Morduch and Haley 2002. Analysis of the Effects of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction. NYU 
Wagner Working Paper No. 1014 (June). p. 1 
65 Fisher and Sriram 2002. Beyond Micro-Credit: Putting Development Back Into Micro-Finance. 
Oxfam. 
66 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 3 
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Expanding the scale of analysis, it is noted by Sidwell that while Fair Trade has a 
significant presence among the communities in the ‘relatively developed’67 country of 
Mexico, Fair Trade is less involved in lower income countries like Ethiopia 68. 
However, again, this is a very simple interpretation of the evidence. Firstly, it is 
pertinent to notice that Fair Trade certification, which first appeared as the Max 
Havelaar mark in Holland, was in fact developed by a Dutch NGO at the behest of, 
and in coordination with, Mexican coffee farmers69. As the birthplace of FLO 
Fairtrade it appears logical that Mexico became the country with the most certified 
groups in the initial stages of development, just as coffee has been the main stay of the 
product range.  
However, it should be noted that this situation is slowly changing as the demand for 
certification in Mexico is increasingly met, resources are being used in other places to 
equalise impact. Between 2002 and 2007, only 5 new Mexican organisations were 
certified by the FLO 70. This is in comparison with the 199 groups from Africa that 
received the Mark. It is further of note that these groups represent a mixture of hired 
labour farms in South Africa through to small scale cotton producing co-operatives in 
Mali, Cameroon and Senegal71.  
Furthermore, the fact that Mexico as a whole might be a richer country than Ethiopia does 
not translate into a reason to criticise this initial distribution of certification. Despite its 
relatively healthy GDP per capita of $12,500 (2007 est.), Mexico is still one of the most 
unequal societies in the world with a GINI coefficient of 50.9 (2005) 72.  This inequality is 
manifest in strong income differences in the region of Chiapas73, where coffee farmers are 
some of the poorest individuals in one of the overall poorest regions in Central America74. 
                                                 
 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid., p. 11 
69 Renard 2003. Fair Trade: quality, market and conventions Journal of Rural Studies 19 p. 319 
70 Barbara Crowther (Head of Communications Fairtrade Foundation) 2008. Personal Communication.  
71 Ibid. 
72 CIA world Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mx.html#Econ 
73 Burbach 1994. Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas. New Left Review 205 
74 Benjamin 1989. A rich land, a poor people: politics and society in modern Chiapas. University of 
New Mexico Press. 
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Sixty percent of the 72,000 coffee producers in Chiapas are indigenous and many live in 
extreme poverty75.  
 
In fact, detailed analysis conducted in the 1990s shows that the aggregate income levels 
did not, and are unlikely to, explain any of the poverty in Mexico. The reality is that 
poverty is ‘exclusively a distributional problem and not [due to] a lack of income to meet 
each individual’s basis needs’76. This means that Sidwell’s reference to aggregate income 
levels is , ‘statistically speaking’ irrelevant in the discussion of identifying those most in 
need (based on income figures). However, what is more important is to understand why 
these distributional problems arise.  
 
On this issue it must be noted that there exists another contradiction in Sidwell’s criticism 
and the policy conclusion that poverty reduction must be achieved through improving 
efficiency. By concentrating on efficiency alone , there is no consideration of how or 
where displaced individuals will find a new role in the economy. Sidwell points out that 
the mechanised picking of coffee in Brazil is more efficient than picking by hand in 
Guatemala 77, but fails to consider how these workers would sustain themselves if 
machines took their place. This story of displacement without alternatives has been 
reproduced many times in cases where liberalisation, and not poverty reduction, has 
become the main objective of reform policy78 and is part of a wider criticism made of free 
markets by many commentators79. 
                                                 
 
75 Bray et al argue that small, poor, indigenous producers dominate coffee production in Mexico; citing 
Nolasco et al., (1985) and Regalado Ortíz (1996) they argue that: “Sixty-nine percent of all coffee 
producers have less than two hectares and 60 percent are indigenous peoples (compared to around 12 
percent indigenous peoples nationally)” Bray, et al. 2008. Social Dimensions of Organic Coffee 
Production in Mexico: Lessons for Eco-Labeling Initiatives. In: Bacon ed. Confronting the Coffee 
Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods and Ecosystems in Mexico and Central America.  
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p. 240 Also see: Depalma 1994. In Mexico's Poor South, Coffee Now 
Blights Lives. New York Times. 
76 Szekely 1998. The Economics of Poverty, Inequality and Wealth: Accumulation in Mexico. 
Macmillan Press Ltd.: Basingstoke. p. 98 
77 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 13 
78 Stiglitz makes this argument in the context of the disastrous increases in poverty seen in Russia and 
the ex-soviet block under IMF liberalisation programs: Stiglitz 2002. Globalization and its discontents. 
New York: W. W. Norton. 
79 Where markets have not been regulated, so called ‘gains’ from ‘efficiency’ have been argued to 
come at the expense of other factors such as social capital and the environment. These costs are usually 
not detected in market price systems (being so-called negative externalities) and account for why 
efficiency often leads to environmental and social damage. Only when these external costs become 
serious, are they recognised as the recent trend in environmental and social concerns seems to manifest. 
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Does Fair Trade Make the Excluded Worse Off? 
Another argument deployed by Sidwell is that while Fair Trade benefits some, this 
comes at the direct expense of those outside the governance framework80. However, 
examining the evidence which Sidwell uses to derive this conclusion reveals that 
neither of the cited sources have been peer reviewed (being a blog and the transcript 
of a speech delivered in a church hall) or reference empirical evidence. Instead, both 
are reiterations of simple economic theory (in that they fail to account for the 
complexity of the real world), a point that is even acknowledged by the author of the 
second source. Professor Tyler Cowen explicitly states that this view expressed is a 
theoretical hypothesis and is likely to be untrue in reality: ‘These are all "existence 
theorems"’, he notes, ‘I would not be surprised to learn that current benefits from Fair 
Trade are positive’81. 
A similarly critical problem can be found with the evidence cited in support of the 
point, ‘As the Mexican example shows, even where Fairtrade can improve conditions 
locally for some farmers, it will impose a high cost on others who may be even more 
deserving’82. While there is no evidence cited to back the first instance of this 
assertion83, the following page does include two citations. However, this document  
only mentions the irrelevant information that Mexico, compared to Ethiopia, is 
relatively wealthy, and makes the generalised comment that ‘There is a need to get the 
richer coffee producers out of the market’84. In short, there is no empirical evidence to 
support this argument in the quoted source, or as far as is known, in any of the 
existing literature on the subject.  
Despite the dubious nature of Sidwell’s immediate case, it is necessary to consider the 
theory that does underpin this point. It is true that equilibrium models predict that, in the 
face of fixed demand, the increased success of one producer will result in a loss of market 
                                                 
 
80 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 10 
81 http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2005/12/who_benefits_fr.html; 
http://www.iea.org.uk/files/upld-book353pdf?.pdf 
82 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 10 
83 Ibid.  
84 Singleton. ‘Is Fairtrade coffee a good idea? Globalisation Institute blog [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.alexsingleton.co.uk/2005/01/is -fairtrade-coffee-a-good-idea/ [Accessed: 03/04/2008]. 
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share for another. If Fair Trade captures more of the market, then other non-Fair Trade 
suppliers that cannot get certified must lose out.  
However, the point that this analysis misses is that with more market share taken by 
Fair Trade, more producers will have the conditions of trade and production offered 
by the governance system. Indeed, this was always the express intention of Fair Trade 
which has sought to introduce social standards as part of market expectations. Again, 
it seems pertinent to consider the impact that Fair Trade has had in contributing to the 
general environment of ethical marketing and business operation (highlighted under: 
Does Fair Trade Deprive Worthier Certification Schemes?). If firms that reject social 
considerations are losing their markets they are forced either to reorient their 
operations, or lose out to more socially driven organisations85. Either way, the 
hypothesis  is that production sites that supply ethically orientated markets will slowly 
demonstrate an increasing commitment to the social standards of production. 
However, does this mean that existing FLO certified producers are benefiting at the 
expense of those currently on the outside? When empirical evidence is considered the 
answer appears to be: no. Indeed, the point highlighted by Sidwell that certified 
groups are unlikely to sell all their goods as Fairtrade, testifies to the fact that 
increased demand is not only benefiting individuals already part of the system. 
Instead, new demand is being met from both the expansion of currently existing 
organisations  (by expanding their membership), and the certification of entirely new 
groups from scratch. While the statistics presented earlier reveal the extent of new 
certification in Africa, the case study of the producer group ASOBANU in the 
Dominican Republic (where membership has increased from 191 to 345 individuals in 
recent times) shows that existing certification is including more and more individuals 
all the time86.  
Having said this, Sidwell’s position still suggests that non-certified producers potentially 
earn less if they are not able to get certified in the near future. However, this is only the 
case under the most simplistic version of economic theory. When the idea of product 
                                                 
 
85 While it might be considered that profit will be maintained through increasing downward pressure on 
labour standards, it must be noted that Fair Trade aims to operate in compliment to national and 
international efforts to maintain worker and producer standards. 
86 Barbara Crowther (Head of Communications Fairtrade Foundation) 2008. Personal Communication.  
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differentiation is introduced, it should be considered that as more producers sell certified 
goods, the supply of conventiona l products falls and this generates a price increase. While 
this does not necessarily mean that land owners will not seek to increase social 
obligations to benefit from social marketing niches, it does imply that independent 
producers do not lose out as the simpler version of the theory concludes.  
 
Again, the strength of Sidwell’s analysis is not adequate to support the conclusion that 
he attempts to draw. Further to this, there is substantial credible evidence that the 
alternative policy of universal liberalisation has left many hundreds of thousands of 
people in the developing world poorer than before reforms were introduced. See: Is It 
Clear That Liberalisation Reduces Poverty? 
 
Is Fair Trade Unfair for the Consumer? 
Sidwell also criticised Fair Trade on the basis that while consumers pay more money 
for Fair Trade goods, vis-à-vis conventional items, ‘just 10% of the premium paid for 
Fairtrade coffee reaches the producer’87.  
The first issues is identified by Sidwell himself, refined by us above, that case study 
evidence does not provide sufficient proof to back universal claims. If this figure of 10% 
is traced back to the original calculation by Tim Harford88, it is found that it derives from 
one specific case study and is not offered as a either universal figure for all Fair Trade 
coffee, or indeed, an average 89.  
Instead, re-contextualising this figure reveals that Hartford in fact notes that while one 
case produces this figure, the price difference between a cup of FLO certified coffee 
and a non-certified cup is also sometimes as little as 1p90 or even  zero91. Thus, the 
                                                 
 
87  Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 11 
88 The immediate reference is to The Economist, who reference Harford. 
89 Harford 2006. The undercover economist : exposing why the rich are rich, the poor are poor--and 
why you can never buy a decent used car! New York: Oxford University Press. p. 33 
90 The Co-op supermarket for example has reduced price the differential to only 1p.Barnett. 2007. 
Editorial: Addressing consumer demand for ethical goods [Online].  Available at: [Accessed: 
20/04/08]. 
91 Harford 2006. The undercover economist : exposing why the rich are rich, the poor are poor--and 
why you can never buy a decent used car! New York: Oxford University Press. p. 33 
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figure of 10 % is not universally representative, especially as it derives from the case 
of a fully processed cup of coffee served in a coffee shop. This means that these 
calculations should not be generalised to either coffee beans or ground coffee bought 
in a supermarket.  
 
Further, generalisations across Fair Trade labels are not valid as the structure and 
ownership of value chains varies greatly within the Fair Trade category. Some labels 
such as the Divine Chocolate Company, Cafédirect and Oxfam’s chain of coffee 
shops, Progreso, have undertaken innovative strategies to increase the return to 
producer communities92. While there are issues around the extent to which these cases 
reflect the impact of FLO Fairtrade certification93, the fact that producers have an 
ownership stake in higher parts of these value chains (and hence retail profits), 
suggests that generalisations about ‘Fair Trade’ carry little credibility.   
The second important point, highlighted by Harford himself, is that irrespective of the 
numerical price difference, this differential does not arise from Fair Trade regulation; they 
are in fact a result of conventional business practice94. Harford specifically notes the 
retailer in this case used the appeal of ethical attributes to charge prices over and above 
those needed to cover the additional overheads needed for Fairtrade coffee. This means 
that this case study is less relevant in discussing Fair Trade’s effectiveness than Sidwell 
tries to claim95.  
                                                 
 
92 Doherty and Tranchell 2005. New Thinking in International Trade? A Case Study of The Day 
Chocolate Company. Sustainable Development 13; Rhonchi 2002. Monitoring Impact of Fair Trade 
Initiatives: A Case Study of Kuapa Kokoo and the Day Chocolate Company. London: Twin; Tallontire 
2000a. Partnerships in fair trade: reflections from a case study of Cafe 'direct. Development in Practice 
10 
93 Because buyers in these chains are socially orientated they go further that FLO regulation requires 
and thus are not reflective of conventional value chains that use Fairtrade certification. This is an issue 
which is being explored as part of on going research. 
94 Harford 2006. The undercover economist : exposing why the rich are rich, the poor are poor--and 
why you can never buy a decent used car! New York: Oxford University Press. p. 33 
95 This is not to say that these arguments are totally irrelevant to thinking about the reform of Fair 
Trade. This is because there are currently no licensing requirements or standards applicable to retailers 
involved in Fair Trade. Thus, a policy conclusion derived from the above discussion might be that such 
a standard is desirable, and indeed the best way to minimise the difference between the extra costs paid 
by consumers and the increased returns seen in the developing world. 
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The reason for this overall situation is that the ‘importing and retail industries work on 
a margin bases’96 which means that even if extra mark-ups are not added, higher 
prices paid to producers are still multiplied at every stage of the value chain. The 
implication is that each actor in the chain will receive more profit on Fair Trade 
products than they would on non-certified goods.  
Under simple analysis this might be considered a negative of Fair Trade. However, a 
more complex view problematises this simple assumption and adds further weight to the 
argument that Fair Trade is not charity, but in fact a system of regulation that works 
inside trade97. This is because as opposed to charity, which relies on moral consciousness, 
actors in the supply chain are motivated to trade certified goods in place of non-certified 
alternatives through profit incentives. If a consumption based methodology of relieving 
poverty is accepted as desirable , then it might be necessary to accept that members of the 
supply chain need incentives to facilitate this. Without the involvement of retailers after 
all, the idea of a consumer based poverty alleviation strategy is somewhat of a non-starter. 
Alternatively to argue as Sidwell does, that appropriate incentives are the most 
sustainable way to motivate actors to transfer resources to the developing world (see his 
criticisms on the sustainability of Fair Trade), but then to criticise retailers for taking 
incentives, is again, logically contradictory. 
 
Finally, Sidwell also argues that because Fair Trade cheats the consumer with poor 
quality, it would be better to concentrate on improving standards than paying a 
minimum price98. However, this argument is contestable on many grounds, not least 
that Fair Trade goods are no less subject to forces that demand physical quality than 
any other product. While FLO standards specify standards of quality99, those entering 
in relationships governed by such rules are no less able to withdraw for reasons of 
inappropriate quality than conventional actors100. Further, discipline over inadequate 
quality has been empirically documented, with first order cooperatives penalising 
                                                 
 
96 Nicholls and Opal 2005. Fair trade : market-driven ethical consumption. London: Sage. p. 51 
97 For the argument that Fair Trade works within the market see: Barratt Brown 1993. Fair Trade: 
Reform and Realities in the International Trading System. London: Zed Books; Nicholls and Opal 
2005. Fair trade : market-driven ethical consumption . London: Sage; Renard 2003. Fair Trade: quality, 
market and conventions Journal of Rural Studies 19 
98 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 14 
99 For example see: Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2007a. Fairtrade Standards for 
Bananas for Small Farmers' Organizations.  Appendix 1. 
100 Ibid. 
 
 
30 
farmers for defects101. While some direct observations have not seen clear incentives 
for increasing quality at farmer level it is suggested that these are likely to develop as 
the supply chain and the market mature102. Indeed, case study evidence from Tanzania 
shows that first order cooperatives have responded to wider incentives, and have been 
paying price premiums to farmers for Special grade coffee within the FLO Fairtrade 
framework103.  
In the mean time, if free markets signals are to be accepted as indicating what is desirable 
(as Sidwell argues), consumer demand has sent clear signals that the ‘quality bundle’104 
offered by Fair Trade is more than desirable. However, in the mean time, Fair Trade 
guarantees an increased return over low market prices, and potentially provides the capital 
necessary to invest in such quality improvement. (An investment that is argued in Part 
Four, might not be possible without a guaranteed minimum price, and thus , far from 
retarding quality gains, minimum prices under the right conditions are likely to facilitate 
improvements). 
 
Is Fair Trade Less Efficient than Other Strategies? 
 
Now let us look at the idea that Fair Trade is inefficient at transferring resources. The 
conclusion here is that Sidwell lacks the conclusive evidence necessary to make such a 
strong case, and again it seems that  an alternative perspective is worthy of consideration.  
 
The only way that Fair Trade could be conclusively proved as less efficient than other 
methods of resource transfer would be through a thorough cost-benefit comparison. 
However, given the complexity of such a study it is unsurprising that no interested party 
has yet undertaken such work, and thus that the evidence, which is supposedly so ‘clear’, 
simply does not exist.  
These problems do not preclude thinking about what is important in attempting to 
calculate the true costs and benefits of a range of options. For example, the Fair Trade 
                                                 
 
101 Bacon 2005. Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees Reduce 
Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua? World Development 33(3). 
102 Ibid. p. 505 
103 Parrish, et al. 2005. What Tanzania's coffee farmers can teach the world: A performance-based look 
at the fair trade-free trade debate. Sustainable Development 13(3). p. 182 
104 See our analysis of what constitutes quality under: Is Fair Trade Charity? 
 
 
31 
movement claims that there are an immense amount of positive externalities brought 
about by its trade based methodology. One of these is the function of raising 
awareness on issues of trade and development. While it is true that this involves the 
creation of markets for FLO Fairtrade certified goods, evidence cited above suggests 
that this wider awareness also contributes to the uptake of all sorts of socially 
orientated products (see sections: Does Fair Trade Deprive Worthier Certification 
Schemes?)  
Building on this, quantifying the impact of Fair Trade at the other end of the value chain 
is perhaps even more problematic. Case study evidence suggests that the level of  
information and confidence possessed by non-FLO certified producers increases if they 
are located in areas that have certified farms , and thus gives them more resources to 
negotiate appropriate prices105. Fair Trade can also be identified with a wider number of 
other multipliers well recognised as important factors in broader development processes. 
These include improving levels of health and education as well as economic 
development106. This point is not highlighted to suggest that these externalities only exist 
with Fair Trade, but instead to point out that quantification in ‘value for money 
calculations’ is outstandingly complex. The implication of this is that those claiming to 
have ‘clear’ answers should always be read critically. 
  
It might also be argued that Fair Trade is ineffective because of the amount of money 
institutions like the FLO and the Fairtrade Foundation spend on advertising and 
marketing107. The first important point is that this is not money taken from the clutches of 
producers. Instead, this finance comes from the investment made by producers in 
certification to augment the qua lity attributes of their products (see: Is Fair Trade 
Charity?, on page 18). 
 
Although it is possible to quantify the cost of this outgoing, and its influence on sales of 
FLO Fairtrade certified goods 108, it is not possible to accurately capture the benefit that 
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this returns. What can be said is that all the other mechanisms suggested by Sidwell will 
also have quantifiable overheads which must be considered. Like Fair Trade, these 
charities need to promote their brands and the solutions that they offer to help the poor. 
Even if the cost only extends to the relatively low expense of maintaining a website and a 
small body of staff, the level of public contributions are going to be reflected in the 
promotional work that is undertaken.  
 
Again Sidwell’s criticisms not only fail to stand up to critical thinking, but also lack 
coherence. This is because it is first argued that Fair Trade is too small and thus 
irrelevant109 but then that efforts to expand the movement through marketing are also 
inappropriate 110. Logically it is not possible to genuinely support both these points at 
once, and indicates to us that this is far from a dispassionate evaluation.   
 
Instead, it is suggested that the intention of the Adam Smith Institute was to highlight as 
many criticisms as possible in order to bolster the ir primary point of contention with Fair  
Trade.  Given the Institute’s overall aim to promote free markets solutions, it appears 
logical that the main and natural point of opposition is the payment of minimum prices. 
However, despite the efforts of the Adam Smith report to reify free markets policies as 
the best way to reduce poverty, alternative analysis in Part Three seriously questions this 
assumption. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, there are significant  problems with the individual arguments deployed in 
the Adam Smith report, Unfair Trade. The most fundamental is that many of the 
arguments are simply assertions which have little or no evidence to support them. 
Where evidence is offered it has been suggested that the author has often failed to cite 
credible, or in some cases, relevant evidence for his conclusions. Far from offering an 
evaluation of Fair Trade, the Adam Smith paper has simply sought to bolster its 
primary opposition to Fair Trade – the payment of minimum prices – with as many 
other criticisms  as possible, irrespective of overall coherence or evidential rigour. 
Given the importance of the minimum price issue, the rest of the paper as been given 
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over to its discussion; however, as far as the other criticisms are concerned, the 
conclusion of this section must be that the evidence in support of Sidwell’s case is far 
from ‘clear’. 
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Part Three 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Liberalisation Alone as the Best Means to Growth with 
Equality: A critique111 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As well as challenging the effectiveness of Fair Trade, Sidwell claims that, ‘the evidence 
is clear: free trade works’112 by increasing economic growth and reducing poverty. These 
conclusions lead to the policy suggestion that ‘tariffs everywhere should be reduced’113. 
To back this argument Sidwell refers to economic theory and argues that those countries 
which have done the most to reduce poverty have done so through programs of 
liberalisation114. This then helps to back Sidwell’s reification of the advantages of free 
market policies, an account which is then used to implicitly characterise Fair Trade as 
constituting a dangerous political agenda, intent on opposing and reversing poverty 
reducing liberalisation115. 
However, alternative analysis suggests that the specific cases of poverty reduction 
cited in the Adam Smith report cannot be attributed solely to programs of 
liberalisation. While such a conclusion might be suggested by simply correlating 
liberalising regimes and a fall in poverty, this does not amount to a credible account 
of causation116. Instead, the evidence and analysis presented below suggests that while 
successful poverty reduction strategies have utilized market incentives, it has been the 
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appropriate management of market systems over time which best explains the 
difference between successes and failures. Further the supposed ‘reality’ that, 
‘economic development through free market reform actively favours the poor’ is also 
problematic 117. Instead it is argued that while liberalisation might have led to growth 
in some cases, this should not been a universal expectation as some countries have 
seen their incomes fall after liberalisation.  Nor is it accepted that growth and free 
markets automatically reduce poverty as again empirical evidence shows that even 
where liberalisation has been strong, the poor have often lost out under liberalisation 
programs.  
 
What China and India Really Show: poverty reduction and the 
importance of unorthodox compliments to liberal policies 
The first national example identified in support of liberalisation is China. This case is 
taken up by Sidwell because it has indeed reduced poverty in a significant way during 
a period of liberalisation118. However, the argument is only accurate to a limited 
degree because correlation should never be taken as an explanation of causation119. 
What must be recognised is that before reforms began China was arguably the most 
highly regulated economy in the world120. This is important as Borensztein and Ostry 
point out that despite impressive growth during and after the reform, ‘a perhaps less 
well known fact is that [economic] performance was also strong in the years leading 
up to the reform’121. This means that far from kicking off economic growth and 
poverty reduction, liberalisation contributed to a process that had already been 
brought about through tight state regulation. 
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Even when liberalisation was introduced it was ‘gradual and partial, with extensive 
government intervention in and domination of key product markets’122. For example 
in agricultural, liberalisation has been slow and only undertaken at the margins of the 
economy123. According to Qian and Roland 124, this explains how this system 
generated efficiency without market signals, while at the same time making sure that 
there were few losers from carefully managed structural changes125. While this sector 
is not solely responsible for the reduction of poverty126, it has certainly made 
significant contributions 127 which should be attributed to more that just liberalisation. 
This is the case across the majority of the economy and although China has reduced 
tariffs, this has not implied the development of a free market capitalist economy. Instead, 
industrial development has been administered by the state under a system termed ‘local 
state corporatism’ 128. This highly masked but extensive control has allowed the state to, 
‘take revenue from one enterprise and use it to develop another through an informal 
process of borrowing and redistribution of debt’129. Lau et al. 130 point out that this 
intervention was critical in achieving political support for the reform, maintaining its 
momentum, and minimizing adverse social implications throughout the economy. More 
importantly, it allowed the state to manage market forces and develop the capacity of 
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enterprise in a coordinated way (an element of policy that is argued to be essential in 
readying local economies for interaction with global markets131).  
Although not as extreme in either its historical or contemporary regulation, a move 
past simply deriving causation from correlation between free markets and growth 
(which has been contested anyway132), suggest that highlighting liberalisation alone is 
a misrepresentation of the evidence. As a framework for this analysis some have 
suggested the importance of differentiating, ‘between a promarket and a probusiness 
orientation’133. Instead of picking liberalisation alone, those seeking to draw policy 
conclusions from India should look to the whole package of measures which 
contributed to expanding output and reducing poverty.  
Indeed, those examining India’s liberalisation have gone some way to identifying 
non-market factors and argue that the state has been instrumental in expanding local 
capacity before liberalisation programs were launched. While protectionism prior to 
the 1980s take-off did correlate with low growth (again showing intervention does not 
prevent gains), the effects on the development of local capacity is seldom considered. 
For example, in the area of agriculture, which contributed the most to poverty 
reduction prior to the 1980s, analysis has seen ‘firm pay offs ’ from significant non-
market and interventionist policies in the form of government investments and 
subsidised credit134. Others make the same argument about the role of state capacity 
building in the manufacturing and IT sectors which have subsequently taken over the 
function of driving growth and poverty reduction135.  
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On this basis it should be considered that policy conclusions taken from the 
experience of China and India that simply isolate liberalisation are somewhat 
simplistic. This is because these suggestions miss what are likely to be essent ial 
intermediate variables in establishing beneficial outcomes for local actors and 
particularly the poor. Instead, alternative analysis concludes that: 1) while 
liberalisation certainly appears to enhance growth rates, it is not shown to be a 
universal prerequisite, 2) Indeed, while insulation of local economies does not 
preclude growth, it appears to be important in building the capacity of actors to derive 
benefits from the liberalisation process136. Enterprise requires many factors to be 
successful and the development of an appropriate base of capability is likely to be an 
essential criterion in making efficiency gains under market forces. In simple terms, if 
the market is a competitive race to be the most efficient, it should not be expected that 
the slowest (least capable) come last (despite greater motivation to catch up). Overall 
while liberalisation has been a key component in success, under more detailed 
analysis these cases suggest that poverty is best addressed through appropriately 
regulated interaction with the world economy. It is this principle that is taken forward 
to Part Four where it is suggested that Fair Trade might have the potential to carry out 
the same nurturing function for those currently involved in commodity production.  
 
Growth in Hong Kong: the importance of establishing 
contingencies in promoting liberalisation 
 
Sidwell stands on slightly more stable ground in pointing to the example of Hong Kong as 
being support for poverty reduction through free market policies. However again, there 
are those who argue that even this country did not grow solely through liberal markets but 
that changes were also guided by government interventions. Some studies highlight the 
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role of government intervention in building the capacity of business137, and increasingly 
so after the instability of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997138.  Other have noted that as 
the government subsidised public housing to roughly half the population, this might have 
meant that it has been actively involved in depressing the cost of labour 139.  
 
However, it is also important to consider how relevant the case of Hong Kong is to the 
promotion of liberalisation in other countries. This is because as an island entrepôt for 
the surrounding economies, Hong Kong benefited from its geographical position and 
function as an international trade hub on an unprecedented scale 140. Robert Wade 
notes that "its economic growth is a function of its service role in a wider regional 
economy, as entrepôt trader, regional headquarters for multinational companies, and 
refuge for nervous money."141 In short, Hong Kong took advantage of a very specific 
situation and it is thus far from clear if other countries can expect to see similar results 
based on the same policies. Indeed, context specific characteristics are increasingly 
recognised as important, and for this reason one-size-fits-all policies such as those 
advocated by Sidwell are finding themselves increasingly criticised142.  
 
The Importance of Regulating Markets: Other evidence linking 
management and poverty reduction 
Indeed, it has become increasingly difficult to argue that strong growth has been 
promoted by exclusively free market policies bereft of significant unorthodox state 
interventions. Instead, it is increasingly accepted that other countries, like Japan, 
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Taiwan and Korean with comparably high rates of growth and poverty reduction have 
also been able to achieve this through appropriately managed interaction with the 
wider world143. Even the World Bank, which began by arguing that it was free 
markets that had brought about the Asian miracle, has been unable to ignore this 
evidence144. While there are still those that argue for the primacy of the importance of 
market processes, these commentators are finding this position increasingly hard to 
defend 145. 
However, on the other hand, it would be equally wrong to argue that simple intervention 
alone has been the key factor. As well as modification of price incentives that carefully 
managed the interaction of local economies with the international system,146 these 
governments (and it should be noted that similar arguments have been made for the 
economic success of the now richer world147) also made more direct interventions in other 
areas such as credit provision, technology adaptation, research and design, investment 
planning, labour market planning, and the promotion of institutions that allow public -
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private cooperation148. This nuanced view must also take into account the exact 
relationship between the state and the private sector  and it is argued by many that this has 
been a key factor in differentiating successful intervention from that which has spelled 
inefficiency, waste and stagnation149.  
The conclusion from this evidence appears to be that while appropriate incentives are 
likely to be a necessary component of successful growth strategies, orthodox policies 
that often stem from this fact150 are likely to be complimented by well managed 
unorthodox components151. These unorthodox elements usually include intervention in 
incentive systems and resource allocation which seek to actively manage the national 
economies interaction with international markets. This means that instead of taking a 
black and white approach to free markets versus intervention, it is more appropriate to 
consider all policies that have been deployed to fostered successful economic 
development in poorer countries152.  
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Is It Clear That Liberalisation Reduces Poverty? 
 
The above analysis highlights a significant amount of evidence which questions the 
argument that cases of strong economic growth and poverty reduction are attributable to 
liberalisation alone. However, it is also important to consider the results of those cases 
where policies have been more qualifiable  as liberal. 
 
For example, it is true to say that ‘counties such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Bolivia and Peru did more liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in the course of a 
few years than East Asian countries have done in four decades’153. However, the 
empirical record of these states show that the evidence is far from clear in establishing 
that liberalisation is the best way to promote growth154 or reduce poverty155. For example, 
Ocampo finds that where, ‘in 1980 35% of households were in a state of poverty, that 
proportion stood at 41% in 1990, and in 1994 the figure was still as high at 39%’156. To 
take an individual study of the relationship between liberalisation and growth, despite the 
aggregate income rise which accompanied Mexico’s program of liberalisation between 
1984 and 1992 (35 % average income expansion) , abject poverty and inequality both 
rose157.  
 
Although not a universal pattern158, this is not the only case where programs of 
liberalisation have been followed by increased incidences of poverty159. As Sidwell notes, 
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in the case of Africa, programs of intensive market intervention were correlated with the 
failure to increase growth and reduce poverty160. However, it is not clear that 
liberalisation has succeeded in reversing this trend as while macro level analysis shows a 
reduction in poverty based on aggregate income levels, multidimensional, locally focused, 
livelihood approaches are much less positive 161.  
 
These mixed results, both within and between different methodologies, have raised 
concerns about advocating the one-size-fits-all policy of liberalisation that Sidwell 
suggests. Despite the necessity of creating winners, and by definition losers, during 
readjustment162 ‘many commentators fear, however, that in the shorter run, one of the 
steps towards openness-trade liberalization harms poorer actors in the economy, and that, 
even in the longer run, successful open regimes may leave some people behind in 
poverty’ 163.  
 
For this reason scholars have increasingly sought to move past studies that simply 
correlate liberalisation and growth, and instead understand the intermediate variables that 
are causing variations in the above results. Liberals who take this approach advocate a 
basic , non interventionist set of institutions 164 to ensure liberalisation results in economic 
growth, and often make concessions to the poor in the form of bolt-on poverty reduction 
strategies. However, this approach has been strongly criticised for many reasons 165, and 
many argue that these provisions are not likely to help as they fail to address the 
fundamental reasons why the poor suffer during liberalisation166. This later argument is 
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certainly supported by the analysis above – as the successful states of Asia have 
intervened much more fundamentally – and is explored in the rest of this paper.  
 
Although many of the institutions required under orthodox liberal policy – such as secure 
property rights and fiscal discipline – are not necessarily refuted by this perspective , it 
highlights the importance of focusing on the capabilities of individual actors, businesses 
and sectors. Poulton et al. summarise the position when they note that: ‘Countries, sectors 
and particular groups within society (particularly the poorest) will only benefit from trade 
and marketing liberalisation if they are equipped to compete in newly competitive 
markets’167.  
 
Based on this idea the next section will argue that although poor commodity producers 
are able to recognise market incentives, they are not necessarily able  to take advantage. 
Thus , it is suggested that if the ability of certain groups to benefit from free markets is 
conditioned by their level of capacity, bolstering this capacity might be an important 
prerequisite to reducing poverty through liberalisation. On this basis it can be suggested 
that far from retarding long term poverty reduction, Fair Trade provides the possibility for 
resource reallocation by helping to alleviate the above constraint that free trade policies 
only seem to reinforce.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The evidence offered in the Adam Smith Institute Report that free trade is fair trade 
because it is the best way to reduce poverty is an over simplification of the empirical 
evidence. This isolation of liberal and liberalising elements in economic policy totally 
fails to recognise the essential role played by unorthodox and interventionist state policies 
that have worked alongside more orthodox components.  
 
In a more sophisticated reading of the evidence, it has been noted that while market 
interventions have failed in some examples, this has been for reasons specific to the 
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context and not because of inherent problems with governing markets. It is suggested that 
the difference between productive interventions (China, Japan, Korean, Taiwan, India etc) 
and those that have failed (Latin Americas, Africa and arguably some of the Asian states 
like Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia 168) has been the ability of governments to balance 
the need to increase local business capacity with the drive for quality and efficiency, 
necessary to compete in world markets.  
 
Further, this section has identified significant evidence which questions Sidwell’s 
argument that liberalisation clearly leads to a reduction in poverty.  A more nuanced 
approach to the evidence shows that nothing should be taken as black and white. Free 
market polices can facilitate growth and poverty reduction, but equally increase the 
incidences of poverty if other variables are not considered. Finally it has been suggested 
that an important consideration is the capabilities of poorer members of society to benefit 
from market forces, and this will be explained in more detail below. 
Concluding with the issue of methodology, perhaps the best way to sum up the Adam 
Smith report is to echo Sidwell’s own words, ‘Put simply, tariffs everywhere should 
be reduced’: perhaps those wishing to comment on how best to alleviate the plight of 
the poor might do well to observe that this is perhaps not an issue that even can, nor 
even should be ‘put simply’. 
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Part Four 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The Importance of Micro Realities: An alternative theory with 
which to consider Fair Trade 
________________________________________________________________________ 
While many of Sidwell arguments lack cohesion, there is a serious contradiction with 
the notion that poverty alleviation can be left to free markets. This is because of the 
explicit assumption that this process relies on ‘free individuals voluntarily seizing 
market opportunities’169.A more considered approach to understanding the issues shows 
that by definition, the poor lack the resources necessary to overcome external constraints 
on their freedom to achieve certain things. While some ‘unfreedoms’ that define poverty 
are fundamentals such as the limitations of hunger, the lack of freedom to derive an 
appropriate living is also a central consideration of this widely accepted interpretation.170. 
Indeed, Sidwell implicitly accepts this theory himself when he argues that consumers 
should donate to charities that provide resources to develop people’s capability to 
compete. However, perhaps because of the overall agenda, he then totally fails to 
consider this in his analysis of Fair Trade. An alternative approach suggests that 
where the poor are often physically unable to respond to market signals due to their 
lack of resources, Fair Trade can help bolster this capacity to become involved in 
markets that were previously off limits. Furthermore, it is suggested that in many 
cases free markets simply fail to offer the incentives necessary to promote the changes 
in production that Sidwell argues are necessary for long term poverty reduction. 
Under this analysis it is increasingly hard to accept that intervention to manage market 
incentives, such as that practiced in the Asian states mentioned above, cannot be 
justified.  
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The Developing World as an Unstable Environment 
 
There is a large body of research that recognises the developing world as a precarious and 
unstable environment171. Developing countries in general are characterised by a high 
concentration of risk as a result of geographical and environmental factors such as 
variable and adverse weather, natural disasters and the prevalence of disease. There are 
also politico-economic factors such as unreliable infrastructure, economic instability from 
macroeconomic shocks (for example from fluctuations in commodity prices), lack of 
legal protection, and in some cases, exposure to open violence.  
Rural areas have even higher concentrations of risk to welfare as they tend to have 
higher incidences of disease and environmental hazards172. This is certainly important 
for agricultural commodity producers who rely on products that are highly susceptible 
to these risks. Although some volatility in commodity prices has been caused by over 
production, for example the entry of Vietnam into the Robusta coffee sector173, the 
frequent source of short terms price volatility comes from natural phenomenon174.  
This situation clearly requires a methodology for mitigating this threat to welfare, but 
agricultural areas are also characterised by a lack of formal institutions for achieving 
this 175. Formal insurance and credit provision, that often acts as a substitute 176, are not 
provided as appropriate markets have failed to emerge. To some extent this can be 
attributed to the absence of a legal system to secure property rights177 but is mainly 
because spare and low density populations cannot afford to meet the costs necessary to 
incentivise such services178. While this demonstrates how markets can often fail to 
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develop given structural constraints, it means that risk and vulnerability are omnipresent 
factors in the lives of those who live in this context.  
 
Given the high prevalence of risk, and the lack of formal institutions to offset it, economic 
actors seek to mitigate shocks to their welfare through informal systems of 
management179. Although a variety of techniques are employed180, one widely used 
method in response to economic uncertainty is production diversification181 - the very 
policy recommended by Sidwell in response to low and volatile commodity prices182. 
Having said this , there are still producers who remain in sectors that do not provide 
enough to cover the costs of basic needs. Instead of diversifying into higher incomes and 
more stable production, these actors choose low income activities or adopt other 
techniques of managing risk. Importantly, it has been observed that these other strategies 
not only fail to increase income, but also involve the active reduction of basic and 
essential inputs such as nutrition and health (de Waal 1989). Bacon comments that ‘many 
of these mechanisms such as pulling children out of school to avoid expenses [and work 
in direct production] can diminish long-term development potential and maintain 
households in a ‘‘poverty trap’’’183 Others have noted that this necessity to manage risk 
also reflects negatively in national economic growth184. As a result these techniques 
perpetuate poverty on numerous levels , and so explaining why these techniques are 
adopted in preference to diversification goes a long way to answering Sidwell’s call to 
understa nd why commodity producers are poor in the first place185. 
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Risk Management is Costly 
The fact is that, just as formal insurance needs to be paid for, diversification is also 
very costly. Despite assumptions, even the most (seemingly) simple income strategies 
require financial186, as well as social187 and human188 capital to meet barriers to entry 
for new activities. While financial capital is unlikely to be available to the poor, other 
necessities might be more prohibitive given that physical capital, social contact and 
knowledge often only serve very specific purposes. To illustrate the point Putnam 
notes that, ‘both an egg-beater and an aircraft carrier enter into the American national 
accounts as little bits of physical capital, and yet they are not interchangeable. Try 
fixing your morning omelette with an aircraft carrier, or try attacking the Serbs with 
an eggbeater’189. 
This Putnam notes is equally true of social capital190 and the same point must be made 
about certain types of human capital – knowing how to use an egg-beater does not qualify 
you to control an aircraft carrier – and Adam Smith himself alluded to the role that 
specific education could have on income possibilities191. It should be further noted that 
while money (for the most part192) allows for the interchange of other forms of capital via 
markets193, this is more complex than theories often allow. Firstly, exchange is not cost 
free: education, socialisation and exchange all carry costs in terms of financial capital and 
opportunity cost. Perhaps more importantly, markets do not guarantee the ability to 
convert one type of capital into another: for example the sunk costs in crops and plants, or 
even capital tied up in tools, might not be recoverable in any degree. Where farming is all 
that producers have, converting this capital into that needed for other livelihoods might be 
impossible as chances of finding a buyer for low return physical capital are logically 
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limited194. Thus, it can be concluded that access to diversification is dictated both by 
aggregate levels of capital as well as conditions of specificity.  
The identification of these costs and limitations provides the important answer as to why 
poor producers remain in low return and volatile sectors that perpetuate their poverty. The 
simple truth is by very definition, the poor lack of a various types of capital195 needed too 
meet this cost: those who need to diversify most, are those least able to carry forward 
such action.  
Indeed, there is a large quantity of empirical evidence which suggests that those closer 
to the poverty line are likely to be less able to diversify in response to any given 
system of incentives196. In an illustrative case from Ethiopia and Tanzania, empirical 
work has identified that the poor ideally wish to pursue higher income strategies 
through investment in cattle, but simply lack the capabilities to operationalise this 
rational economic decision197. Instead, they use strategies which they can access 
including petty trade, dungcake and fire wood collection198 as well as being more 
strongly involved in less capital intensive crop production199. Understanding these 
economic decisions on the basis of constrained capability (versus the idea that actors 
are free to respond to market incentives) is equally applicable to commodity 
producers. Although they might want to diversify or capture more income by moving 
up the value chain, the reality is that such a move is unlikely to be possible where 
actors are poor. This goes a good way to explaining why in response to price falls, 
producers increase output and effectively worsen market conditions instead of 
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diversifying away from the sector. It also helps answer the question why these 
individuals are poor in the first place.  
Further Costs that Dissuade a Response to Market Signals 
 
The second reason that growth should not be expected to come from ‘individuals 
voluntarily seizing market opportunities’200, is that despite higher potential returns being 
indicated by the market, these alternative opportunities might be perceived as very 
uncertain201.  
 
As with any, sector individual actors and economic theories alike recognise that new 
income strategies must be rendered profitable through processes of ‘self discovery’202, 
and ‘learning by doing’ 203. This means that even if commodity producers can access an 
alternative income strategy, they might not be able to make the operation adequately 
profitable for a certain period of time. This is likely to be less of an issue for those who 
have the capabilities to smooth their consumption in the meantime; however, again the 
irony is that those most in need of diversification are the least able to risk experiencing a 
decline in their income 204.  
An added problem with diversification within the agricultural sector is that there is 
usually a considerable time- lag before plants and crops yield produce of high enough 
quantity and quality to provide investors with a suitable return. Further, as noted 
above, these products are subject to uncontrollable natural shocks which create great 
potential for short term price volatility. This makes it incredibly difficult for producers 
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to plan investment in diversification and is compounded by the fact that even incomes 
from current production strategies cannot be relied upon to provide income to fund 
such schemes. These examples provide concrete reasons why commodity producers 
are likely to be susceptible to what Wolff and De Shalit have called planning-
blight205: where those facing uncertainty, especially in income, may find it very 
difficult to plan many aspects of life. This means that again, actors are far from free to 
respond to market incentives, and thus should not be expected to simple stop 
producing commodities in favour of other products of higher value as Sidwell 
suggests. 
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The Consequences of Micro Realities: Why macro analysis is not 
enough 
 
As commodity markets have already been largely liberalised206, it is argued by Sidwell 
that actors should be left to recognise incentive systems and move into other areas of 
production/income. However, as income diversification carries both immediate and 
perspective longer term adjustment cost, it must be accepted that taking up new income 
strategies might not be affordable to all actors. This implies that promoting diversification 
is not as easy as setting incentive structures.  
 
Similarly, this analysis can further help to explain why liberalisation programs have often 
failed to improve the situation of the poorest members of society207. Although local actors 
are displaced from certain sectors by more capable and thus competitive producers, they 
are unable to re-orientate their production/income strategies. Although they could make a 
living in sectors for which they had built up the required capabilities (in terms of 
financial, social and human capital), these capability bundles might not appropriate to 
enter other areas of production.  
 
Some might argue that self-employed (agricultural) producers should leave their current 
work and move into the wage labour in either the manufacturing or service sectors. This, 
after all, contributes to the structural economic change that is widely recognised as 
essential in the broader development agenda. However, because employment 
opportunities are limited, barriers to entry on the ground are again significant. Human, 
social as well as financial capital is required to undertake migration208, as well as being a 
further prerequisite in obtaining wage employment209. There are issues of how individuals 
sustain themselves in periods of transition and as early as the 1960s , it was recognised 
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that rural-urban migrants could not expect to simply walk into a more remunerative 
work210. Instead, evidence shows that migrants have to spend time in less remunerative 
urban sectors before improving their overall situation and often require support through 
social networks 211. For a complete picture it is also necessary to factor in local knowledge 
that references the poor working conditions, labour rights violations and low 
remuneration of many industrial workers212. The only rational reaction to this set of 
incentives would be to stay in agriculture where security appears considerably higher than 
in the intimidating world of (urban) wage work (we are after all discussing decisions 
made by human beings). 
 
Why Free Markets Do Not Necessarily Promote Diversification 
 
In a final point there is a wider market failure that greatly reduces the ability of the poor, 
or indeed anyone in the developing world, from adopting income strategies in non-
traditional enterprise. The problem is that while the wider value of starting businesses 
with no local precedent (or undertaking diversification into non-traditional enterprise) is 
enormous 213, this is not reflected in market prices. The result is that free markets often fail 
to provide enough personal incentive to entrepreneurs to initiate a break with the current 
economic structure214.  
 
This phenomenon was first noted in accounting for stalled industrialisation in South 
Eastern Europe in 1943, where it was identified that enterprise is unlikely to grow up in 
isolation from similar businesses as concentration of production creates demand for the 
product215. There are also ‘sequential externalities’ from new business which mean that 
where firms exist upstream in a possible supply chain, downstream firms are more likely 
to be set up. However, the opposite is true, and where there are no forward or backward 
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linkages, setting up in a new sector is not likely to be attractive for an individual despite 
the overall potential returns to the wider economy216. 
 
For example, a farmer might recognise that growing coffee is not the best income strategy 
as it returns a low and volatile income. Instead they wish to diversify into higher value 
horticulture217, but cannot find any suppliers of inputs nor immediate buyers for the 
product. This diversification is just not a feasible income strategy to a rational individual 
despite analysis that advocates such a strategy to promote structural change.  In the same 
way, no one will ever start an avocado export company or an avocado seed company 
because again there are no suppliers or markets available. It might be argued that with 
lower tariffs, up and down stream links could be supplied by outside companies. 
However, it will be necessary to first establish a business before commercial relations will 
be considered by potential partners (given that they will already have arrangements with 
other companies), and thus the high levels of uncertainty which retard domestic 
investment still exist.  
 
The implication of this last problem is that while it can be recognised that developing 
countries need to diversify out of low and unstable commodities, making the initial 
steps are very difficult. This might help to explain why countries find it so hard to 
break monoculture export patterns imposed by historical precedent 218. This also helps 
explain why successful growth has been associated with state intervention that aims to 
coordinate business development, provide inputs and facilitate the flow of 
information219 (suggested in Part Three). Again the idea that individual economic 
actors should be left to voluntarily respond to naturally occurring market incentives 
does not seem to hold up under alternative, and arguably more appropriate, analysis.  
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Conclusion 
It has been suggested that relying on macroeconomic theory, such as that offered by 
Sidwell, fails to account for the observed micro realities which characterise a large 
proportion of the developing world. It was suggested that instability of the environment 
makes planning exceptionally difficult while a lack of appropriate capabilities is likely to 
limit the poor from diversifying into high value income/production strategies. It was also 
suggested that without intervention, it is possible that naturally occurring markets will fail 
altogether in providing the necessary incentives for certain aspects of structural economic  
change. This implies that when thinking about poverty reduction strategies it is wise to 
look to systems that account for these micro realities. With this in mind it will be argued 
below that far from retarding diversification, an appropriate application of Fair Trade 
governance might in fact offer poor producers an escape from the poverty trap that 
liberalisation only appears to heighten. 
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How Fair Trade can Alleviate Capability Constraints for 
Poor Producers 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The above analysis presented significant evidence with which to question Sidwell’s claim 
that instead of making market interventions, individuals should be allowed to voluntarily 
seize opportunities to increase income and reduce poverty. These findings correlate with 
those from Part Three where it was argued that far from liberalisation being the best way 
to reduce poverty, the most significant gains have been achieved through strong state 
intervention in building local business capacity. Based on these conclusions, the section 
below argues that far from retarding diversification, Fair Trade can build capacity and 
thus move producers into a position where diversification is a real option as opposed to a 
(simplistic) theoretical possibility.  
 
Although Sidwell suggests that Fair Trade rejects the idea that diversification is necessary 
and that instead producers ‘must keep producing the same crops’220 (again for which no 
evidence is cited) , this is a total misrepresentation of the position of Fair Trade. In fact, 
the Fairtrade Foundation fully recognizes the need for producers to capture greater value 
even if it does reject the idea that unregulated markets are the best way to achieve this221. 
Ian Bretman, Deputy Director of the Fairtrade Foundation, has explicitly noted that the 
‘need to make changes whether it’s improving productivity or diversifying or developing 
                                                 
 
220 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 14. It should be noted that the 
evidence cited in support of this statement refers to a documentary film. Although valuable as a case 
study, this source does not hold the credibility necessary to make such the universal claim. (Imhof and 
Lee 2007) 
221 It should be noted that the correlation drawn between agricultural production and low returns has 
been observed on both the local and international levels: Barrett, et al. 2001. Nonfarm income 
diversification and household livelihood strategies in rural Africa: concepts, dynamics, and policy 
implications. Food Policy 26(4); Ellis and Mdoe 2003. Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in 
Tanzania. World Development 31(8). p. 1379; Prebisch 1950. The Economic Development of Latin 
America and Its Principal Problems. Economic Bulletin for Latin America 7; Reardon, et al. 2001. 
Rural Nonfarm Employment and Incomes in Latin America: Overview and Policy Implications. World 
Development 29(3); Singer 1950. The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing 
Countries. American Economic Review 15. However, it has been suggested that what is important is not 
the physical qualities of these goods, but their economic character. See: Kaplinsky 1993. Export 
Processing Zones in the Dominican Republic: Transforming manufactures into commodities. World 
Development 21(11). This in turn supports the argument that agriculture might still offer a viable 
growth strategy for Africa, see: Wood and Mayer 2001. Africa's export structure in a comparative 
perspective. Cambridge Journal of Economics 25(369-394).  
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in another way’ 222 is a key aspect of reducing poverty. Indeed, the Fairtrade Foundation 
has responded to liberal economic crit ique by arguing that it: ‘Ignores the feedback from 
hundreds of producers that the stability and security offered by Fairtrade enables them to 
invest in diversification which otherwise would be too big a risk’ 223. 
 
This statement maps directly on to the points that have arisen in our elaboration of micro 
realities, and is further backed by other independent case study evidence.224 With all this 
in mind, it is suggested that far from retarding efficiency and diversification, Fair Trade 
regulation stabilises the lives of producers to make diversification psychologically viable 
while contributing the resources to make it materially realisable.   
 
 
                                                 
 
222 Ian Bretman (Deputy Director of the Fairtrade Foundation) – quoted in: The Independent 2007. Fair 
Trade is Booming- but is it still a fair deal? Save & Spend. Saturday 24th February.  pp. 4-5. 
223 Fairtrade Foundation Website 
http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/press_office/press_releases_and_statements/feb_2008/response_to_adam_s
mith_insititute_report.aspx 
224 For case studies on the impact of Fair Trade see: Aranda and Morales 2002. Poverty Alleviation 
through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee: The Case of CEPCO, Oaxaca, Mexico. Colombia: 
Colombia State University; Bacon 2005. Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and 
Specialty Coffees Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua? World 
Development 33(3); Becchetti and Costantino 2008. The Effects of Fair Trade on Affiliated Producers: 
An Impact Analysis on Kenyan Farmers. World Development 36(5); Bird and Hughes 1997. Ethical 
Consumerism: The Case Of "Fairly-Traded" Coffee. Business Ethics: A European Review 6(3); 
Doherty and Tranchell 2005. New Thinking in International Trade? A Case Study of The Day 
Chocolate Company. Sustainable Development 13; Jaffee 2007. Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, 
Sustainability, and Survival. London: University of California Press; Jones, et al. 2000. Fair Trade: 
Overview, Impact, Challenges. . Study to Inform DFID’s Support to Fair Trade ; Lamb 2008. Fighting 
the Banana Wars and other Fairtrade Battles. London: Rider; Littrell and Dickson 1999. Social 
Responsibility in the Market Place . London: Sage; Murray, et al. 2003. One cup at a time: poverty 
alleviation and Fair Trade coffee in Latin America. ; Nigh 2002. Poverty Alleviation Through 
Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Comments on the Implications of the Mexico Reports. 
Colombia: Colombia State Univrsity; Pérezgrovas and Cervantes 2002. Poverty alleviation through 
participation in fair trade coffee networks: The Case of Union Majomut, Chiapas and Mexico. Fair 
Trade Research Group; Raynolds, et al. 2004. Fair Trade Coffee: Building Producer Capacity via  
Global Networks. Journal of International Development 16; Raynolds 2002. Poverty Alleviation 
Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Existing Research and Critical Issues. 
Colorado: Colorado State University; Renard and Perez-Grovas 2007. Fair Trade Coffee in Mexico. In: 
Reynolds, Murray and Wilkinson eds. Fair Trade.  London: Routledge ; Rhonchi 2002. Monitoring 
Impact of Fair Trade Initiatives: A Case Study of Kuapa Kokoo and the Day Chocolate Company. 
London: Twin; Ronchi 2002. The Impact of Fair Trade on Producers and Their Organizations: A Case 
Study with Coocafe in Costa Rica. Brighton: University of Sussex; Smith, et al. 2004. Ethical Trade in 
African Horteculture: gender, rights and participation. IDS Working Paper 223; Tallontire 2000b. 
Partnerships in fair trade: Reflections from a case study of FDIpdirect. Development in Practice 10; 
Taylor 2002a. Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Synthesis of 
Case Study Research Questions and Findings.  
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The Provision of Credit 
 
For those lucky enough to be FLO-Fairtrade certified in certain product categories, buyers 
are required to pay up to 60 % of the final gate price upfront if producers request this  
support225. This advance is credit to invest in the cost of production and has been 
facilitated in recent times by organisations such as Shared Interest who act as a middle -
man institution for the payment of these funds 226. As stated above , one of the classic 
problems with rural economies in the developing world is that they lack affordable formal 
credit institutions 227 and in recent times farmers have found it harder to gain access to 
credit to cover these costs228. 
 
As the FLO framework makes credit available to producers it means families do not need 
to use their own resources to engage in production (in the case of the poor this might 
mean forgoing any number of essential inputs  from education to nutrition) and as a 
consequence resources might be freed for other investments opportunities. This is 
especially important as it can take some time for the final balance to be remitted to 
farmers and it is interesting to note that one case study identified this time to be 
considerably longer in the case of organic certification (73 days) than Fairtrade (41 
days)229. (It is worth noting that in the case of some FLO Fairtrade product specific 
standards, buyers are also required to pay the final balance within 48 hours of the 
shipment being accepted in its destination230). 
 
Credit is almost universally agreed to be an essential element in the development of 
successful economies as it allows investment in quality enhancement and the 
                                                 
 
225 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2007c. Generic Fairtrade Standards for Hired 
Labour. FLO. ; Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2007d. Generic Fairtrade Standards for 
Small Farmers' Organizations. FLO.  And see for example, in the case of coffee: Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International. 2007b. Fairtrade Standards for Coffee for Small Farmers’ Organizations. 
FLO.  
226 Mellor and Moore 2005. Business for a social purpose: Traidcraft and shared interest. Development 
48(1). 
227 Besley 1994. How Do Credit Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit Markets? World 
Bank Res Obs 9(1). 
228 Bacon 2005. Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees Reduce 
Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua? World Development 33(3). p. 505 
229 Ibid. 
230 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International. 2005a. Fairtrade Standards for Bananas for Small 
Farmers’ Organisations. Article: Article 9.1. 
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diversification into higher income strategies231. As is noted below, in some cases the 
Social Premium has been allocated to start local credit unions. This means that Fair Trade 
also offers access to credit that can be used to smooth consumption and thus overall 
standards of welfare232 or build the capacity of producers in other areas. Even those who 
have criticised Fair Trade from other perspectives have been able to accept that this is a 
beneficial element (it appears indicative that no where in the Smith report is the pr ovision 
of credit mentioned); Philip Booth and Linda Whetstone who make the same 
macroeconomic critique as the Smith report note that: 
 
Another important commercial aspect of Fairtrade coffee is that producers can be paid 
before they supply the product to intermediaries. The producers effectively receive credit. 
This credit is available on reasonable terms. There is no question that this is desirable 233. 
   
Minimum Prices as a Stabiliser 
 
Fair Trade also helps stabilise the life of poor producers through the provision of 
minimum prices. This element of the regulations guarantees that producers will be paid 
the return necessary to cover the cost of sustainable production for at least some 
percentage of the ir crop. For the most part this is a higher price than is available on the 
world markets. Although it is correct that much of those crops grown as Fair Trade (up to 
85 % in some cases234) cannot be sold as such, selling some portion of output at a higher 
price must be seen as welfare enhancin g235.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
231 Carswell 2000. Livelihood diversification in southern Ethiopia. Institute of Development Studies 
Working Paper 117   
232 For evidence on the way that other sources of credit are used in this way see: Eswaran and Kotwal 
1989. Credit as Insurance in Agrarian Economies. Journal of Development Economics 31(1). 
233 Booth and Whetstone 2007. Half and Cheer For Fair Trade. Economic Affairs 27(2). pp. 30-31 
234 Lamb 2008. Fighting the Banana Wars and other Fairtrade Battles. London: Rider. p. 134 
235 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International 2007e. Shaping Global Partnerships: Fairtrade 
Labelling Organization International Annual Report 2006/07. Bonn: FLO International, p. 42 
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Indeed, a range of case studies provide statistical support for this argument, as well as 
quantitative evidence which shows that many of the producers testify to the value of this 
input236. These opinions are backed by third party analysis that stresses the importa nce of 
building financial capital to the process of rural income diversification237. 
 
Some commentators and producer groups have noted that minimum prices failed to 
increase for  some time during the 1990s 238. However, while consumers should consider it 
a responsibility to pay attention to price levels that make claims about sustainable 
production, this is not an issue of which the FLO is unaware. For this reason, minimum 
price levels for coffee have been revaluated this year and, ‘From 1 June 2008 all Fairtrade 
Certified coffee producers will receive at least 125 USD cents per pound for Fairtrade 
certified washed Arabica and 120 USD cents for unwashed Arabica, or the market price, 
if higher…For Fairtrade Certified organic coffee an extra minimum differential of 20 
cents is being applied.’239 
 
It is true that manually managed prices require time and resources to track input prices 
and maintain adequate levels to cover the costs of sustainable productions  (the next 
scheduled revaluation of coffee prices is June 2010). However, in light of the above 
analysis , this is likely to be preferable to market mechanisms as these impart a lower 
return and condemn farmers to a standard of living likely to preclude reorientation of 
production/income strategies.  
 
While it might be accepted that minimum prices do increase the possibilities of 
diversification, Sidwell’s position makes two objections. The first is that higher incomes 
might also by available through a concentration on better quality products and/or 
investment in other certification like Utz – which empowers producers in negotiation by 
                                                 
 
236 Kilian, et al. 2006. Is sustainable agriculture a viable strategy to improve farm income in Central 
America? A case study on coffee. Journal of Business Research 59(3). Lamb 2008. Fighting the 
Banana Wars and other Fairtrade Battles. London: Rider. p. 134 For a case that highlights the limited 
but yet very positive impact of Fairtrade price regimes see: Jaffee 2007. Brewing Justice: Fair Trade 
Coffee, Sustainability, and Survival . London: University of California Press. 
237 Ellis and Mdoe 2003. Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Tanzania. World Development 
31(8). 
238 This view derives from personal interviews and conversations with producer representatives, and 
generally references the conditions of local inflation that have increased the cost of vital inputs to the 
reproduction of those social and business life.  
239 (Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International 2008) 
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providing a standard of quality as well as technical and market information240. This 
certainly has the potential to be beneficial as one of the reason commodity producers were 
being driven into poverty after the deregulation of international coffee markets was their 
disempowered position in negotiations 241.  
However, this still leaves prices to be ‘determined in the negotiation process between 
buyer and seller’242. In our view this means that under certain market conditions – 
especially where this standard becomes more common, prices are expected to fall – 
such certification does little to counter these original problems. Indeed, one study 
from Nicaragua found that while organic certified coffee was sold at the farm gate in 
2000-2001 for $0.84/Lb, Fairtrade certified was more valuable at $0.84/Lb 243. A study 
that compared five certification systems discovered that on average FLO Fairtrade 
certified coffee returned a higher price to cooperatives for Aribia in 2004 than coffee 
certified under either Utz, Rain Forest Alliance or Organic labels244. Although this 
empirical evidence is limited, it does suggest that Fairtrade might be a preferable 
system, if increasing incomes is seen as important in the diversification process245. 
However, this is an area that would clearly benefit from further research, investigation 
and certainly cooperation by third party certifiers such as Utz. 
The second objection is that while minimum prices might provide resources to facilitate 
diversification which was not previously possible, guaranteed income disincentivises 
farmers to carry this out. However, this argument can be questioned on a variety of levels. 
Firstly, it fails to recognise some of the fundamentals of its own theoretical underpinning. 
Under the economic models deployed by Sidwell, economic actors are utility maximising, 
rational decision makers, and will thus seek to improve their returns when it is cost 
                                                 
 
240 Utz Certified. Do farmers get a fair price for their coffee? [Online].  Available at: 
http://consumer.utzcertified.org/index.php?pageID=211# [Accessed: 20/04/08]. 
241 Nicholls and Opal 2005. Fair trade : market-driven ethical consumption. London: Sage. pp. 18,33-
38 
242 Utz Certified. Do farmers get a fair price for their coffee? [Online].  Available at: 
http://consumer.utzcertified.org/index.php?pageID=211# [Accessed: 20/04/08]. 
243 These prices are not the same as Fairtrade guaranteed minimums as those levels are set for the price 
of the coffee at the first order cooperative which must deduct business its own business costs as well as 
making community investments. 
244 Raynolds, et al. 2007. Regulating sustainability in the coffee sector: A comparative analysis of third-
party environmental and social certification initiatives. Agriculture and Human Values 24(2). 
Information taken from table on p. 155. 
245 Ibid. Information taken from table on p. 155. 
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effective to do so. This means that while minimum prices (like minimum wages246) are a 
safety net, this does not preclude individuals being motivated to achieve higher levels of 
welfare. Actors are still constantly exposed to market incentives and are free to sell the 
same or other products at world prices whenever the y wish, or leave the Fair Trade 
system all together. Further, as Sidwell notes, individual producers often only see a 
portion of their full crop sold as Fair Trade, and this means that as in the case of Chinese 
agricultural247, incentive structures are part fixed and part market determined. This means 
that incentives to increase overall quality still exist, but that this is now viable as fixed 
prices from Fairtrade increase the chances of making the necessary investments248. 
Finally, as case study evidence shows, it is possible that more detailed price incentives 
will grow up within the Fairtrade system as it matures249. 
 
Again, while there is a need for more empirical data to aid understanding, Sidwell’s 
arguments lack cohesion and suggest an ideological rather than a pragmatic motivation. In 
short, the argument that buying Fair Trade retards diversification is far from ‘clear’. An 
alternative view is that the eventual outcome is likely to be dictated by other variables 
(just as it appears to be contingent in case of state intervention) and it is these factors that 
should perhaps form the centre of ongoing research agendas. 
 
Long Term Contracts as a Stabiliser 
 
Economic stability is likely to be further enhanced as buyers are required to give 
estimations of the qua ntities required in future purchases. These long term contracts 
should be seen as a further improvement over the market conditions of uncertainty250.  In 
his analysis , Hayes concludes that perhaps long term contracts are in fact the most 
                                                 
 
246 In the same way, anyone with any contract – for either the supply of goods or labour – has a 
guaranteed income for a certain time period, unless they loose their job through returning unacceptable 
quality. Thus rejecting Fair Trade for fixing incomes is tantamount to rejecting both minimum wages, 
and any contract that guarantees income. 
247 Qian, et al. eds. 2002. Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations. Nobel 
Symposium. Harvard. 
248 Even if this leads to lower quality being sold as Fair Trade, this can be considered a trade off against 
the alternative where the poor producer how no opportunity to make such investments. This is a micro 
version of the macro trade off argument discussed in:  Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006. Helping Infant 
Economies Grow: Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries. American Economic 
Review 96(2). 
249 Parrish, et al. 2005. What Tanzania's coffee farmers can teach the world: A performance-based look 
at the fair trade-free trade debate. Sustainable Development 13(3). p. 182 
250 Nicholls and Opal 2005. Fair trade : market-driven ethical consumption. London: Sage. pp. 40-41 
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important element of Fair Trade relationships251 as they are likely to he lp producers plan 
future investment in either quality improvement or diversification. However, points of 
contention are the specific definition of long term, and the legal grounding of such 
obligations. This is another area that certainly  deserves more research and potentially 
reform.  
 
The Social Premium 
 
The final element of Fair Trade which contributes to reducing uncertainly and building 
capabilities is the Social Premium. These funds are allocated by local committees and 
have been spent on business development, diversification, as well as improved quality 
and efficiency.  
 
For example, as the premium became more substantial, the coffee producers of Majomut 
in Mexico252 added new business infrastructure, including an electronic selector, a 
training centre and improvements to their central offices253. Some of the money is also 
allocated for the development of a community organic promoter program. In La Selva 254, 
before the social premium is allocated for community projects around 5 percent is used 
for recapitalization of the business255. In Tanzania, the Moshi Rural cooperative has 
used premiums to repair weighing scales and bought spraying equipment as business 
investments256. Money has also gone into building the human and physical capital of the 
community which has in turn allowed families to diversify their incomes. In Oaxaca, 
Chiapas and El Salvador 257, Fair Trade cooperatives have provided training and marketing 
                                                 
 
251 Hayes ed. 2005. On the efficiency of Fair Trade. Association for Heterodox Economics .  
252 For this case see: Taylor 2002b. Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee 
Networks: Synthesis of Case Study Research Question Findings. Sociology Department Colorado State 
University Pérezgrovas and Cervantes 2002. Poverty alleviation through participation in fair trade 
coffee networks: The Case of Union Majomut, Chiapas and Mexico. Fair Trade Research Group 
253 Taylor 2002b. Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Synthesis 
of Case Study Research Question Findings. Sociology Department Colorado State University, p. 14 
254 For this case see: Murray, et al. 2003. One cup at a time: poverty alleviation and Fair Trade coffee in 
Latin America.  
255 Taylor 2002b. Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Synthesis 
of Case Study Research Question Findings. Sociology Department Colorado State University, p. 13 
256 Parrish, et al. 2005. What Tanzania's coffee farmers can teach the world: A performance-based look 
at the fair trade-free trade debate. Sustainable Development 13(3). p. 184 
257 See: Aranda and Morales 2002. Poverty Alleviation through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee: The 
Case of CEPCO, Oaxaca, Mexico. Colombia: Colomb ia State University, p. 19 Pérezgrovas and 
Cervantes 2002. Poverty alleviation through participation in fair trade coffee networks: The Case of 
Union Majomut, Chiapas and Mexico. Fair Trade Research Group, p. 16  
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assistance to families to develop alternative income sources. These alternative income 
strategies have included the production and marketing of artisan goods, the establishment 
of community stores, the development of bakeries, and the improved production of basic 
grains.  
 
In the case of the Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union (KKFU), the producer community 
associa ted with Devine Chocolate, the Social Premium has been channelled into funding 
microfinance schemes. Indeed, the commercial success of the producer community has 
meant that by 2003 46 % of Kuapa farmers had become members of Kuapa Kokoo Credit 
Union (compared with 33% in 2001)258. This expanded availability of credit has then 
aided the development of other income generating schemes such as soap making259. 
 
In the area of stabilising community life more broadly there is a growing body of case 
studies that show the Fairtrade Social Premium has significantly contributed to welfare. 
The Social Premium has been used by the Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union to improve 
access to clean water and 19 % of all village societies now have access to this relative 
luxury. According to Doherty and Tranchell, communities have seen a reduction in water 
borne diseases as well as the time it takes to collect water from its source260. This has 
often meant that girls now have more time for education261.  
The concern with health goes further in that over 100,000 people (members and non-
members) in communities with Kuapa societies have received free medical care and 
prescriptions via mobile clinics262. In other communities like UCIRI in Oaxaca for 
example, the social premium has been invested in latrine construction and the 
provision of lorena stoves; both of which have multiplier effects in terms health and 
development263. The UCIRI and CEPCO communities also provide medical assistance 
for producers in the form of community health services and medical supplies for 
                                                 
 
258 Doherty and Tranchell 2005. New Thinking in International Trade? A Case Study of The Day 
Chocolate Company. Sustainable Development 13 pp. 173-174 
259 Ibid. p. 170 Ronchi 2003. Fair Trade Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Progress Report. Brighton: 
University of Sussex 
260 Doherty and Tranchell 2005. New Thinking in International Trade? A Case Study of The Day 
Chocolate Company. Sustainable Development 13 p. 170 
261 Ibid. 
262 Doherty and Tranchell 2005. New Thinking in International Trade? A Case Study of The Day 
Chocolate Company. Sustainable Development 13 p. 174 
263 Raynolds, et al. 2004. Fair Trade Coffee: Building Producer Capacity via  Global Networks. Journal 
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members and non-members264. The Moshi Rural cooperative in Tanzania has laid on 
electricity to their local government run dispensaries to refrigerate medicines265. 
Education has also been a target for the Social Premiums. Four new schools have been 
constructed by the Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union to serve children in a 4km radius 266 
and education inputs are also noted in a range of other studies267. This might be 
attributed to the requirement that certified producer organisations are obliged to 
secure access to primary education for the children of all permanent workers within 
one year of certification268. This is situation should be considered in contrast to the 
Utz standards that only require producers ‘stimulate’ this process, ‘through awareness 
raising meetings with their parents’269 and the total absence of education requirements 
in Rainforest Alliance governance270. This higher standard can be considered notable 
as education has been seen to improve an individual’s economic potential, as well as 
their ability to discuss, debate and to negotiate in a variety of contexts for positive 
ends271. This is important as it enhances abilities to function as an ‘agent of change’ 
and contribute to changing the ‘rules of the game’272 – a change with has been 
identified as the sine que non of genuine poverty alleviation strategies273. 
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Conclusion274 
While the previous section argued that incentive structures are not likely to be enough to 
stimulate diversification, this section has hinted at how Fair Trade might help producers 
affect this important process. It has been suggested that the minimum price, working in 
conjunction with long term contracts, do not have to be seen negatively, but in fact can be 
interpreted as necessary to sta bilise the immediate lives of those involved in commodity 
production. These key features of Fair Trade are then complimented with advanced credit 
and the payment of a Social Premium to make resources available for business 
development and income diversific ation. It is accepted that the payment of minimum 
prices presents the risk of blunting market incentives but it should be emphasised that this 
issue is much more complex that the Adam Smith report makes out. The first point is that 
producers are ill equipped to respond to market prices anyway and the outcome of set 
prices regimes, as shown by our analysis of state managed incentives, depends very much 
on the specifics of relationships involved. Further there is no difference between the 
provision of minimum prices to producers and the payment of minimum wages to 
workers. This is an almost universally accepted method of preventing members of any 
society falling into poverty: Fair Trade is simply occupying regulatory space that states 
have failed to fill.  
 
For these reasons it appears to us , that anyone who has ever bought Fair Trade goods can 
be pleased with their decision. They have stabilised lives and even though this is a small 
step in reducing poverty, it’s a big change to an individual who has been given a freedom 
of options that they otherwise would not have enjoyed.  
                                                 
 
274 On a methodological note the evidence cited above is a limited selection of points which have been 
taken from a much larger, if not still limited, set of case studies. It would be much more credible to 
offer statistical evidence that X % of certified producer groups have increased income by Z %, or Y % 
of producers’ children now attended school on a regular basis. However, this information in not 
available and therefore we cannot speculate on what it might say; although we can present the research 
agenda for further consideration. The only intention here is to provide some concrete example of how 
Fair Trade can build capacity in the developing world in either business development or the community 
as a whole. 
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Overall Conclusion 
This paper is presented in response to the report Unfair Trade issued by the Adam 
Smith Institute at the beginning of Fairtrade Fortnight in March 2008. In his report the 
author contended that, far from being an appropriate trade based strategy to alleviate 
poverty, Fair Trade was an inefficient and inappropriate use of consumer resources. 
The policy implications of this augment were that consumers should withdraw 
patronage from Fair Trade and instead support more worthy certification and charity 
alternatives. Furthermore, it was asserted that universal liberalisation of economic 
markets was the best way to reduce poverty. 
The conclusion of this paper is that the arguments presented by the Adam Smith 
Institute are highly questionable and in no way concrete enough to support the policy 
implications that were claimed. In the first instance, it can be considered that the 
methodology employed by the author lacks credibility from the perspective that the 
think-tank’s broad objective is to promote solutions to social problems, through the 
use market liberal policy. Given that Fair Trade sees the payment of minimum prices 
as an important means of poverty reduction, it can be considered that, from the very 
outside, the conclusion was always likely to be negative. Thus, it must be borne in 
mind that the report was not an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of Fair Trade, but 
to discourage its use in favour of mechanisms that fit with liberal economic theory.  
This methodology is manifest in the content of the Adam Smith report as many arguments 
fail to cite either credible theory or empirical evidence from which they might have 
emerged. Those sources which are cited are arguably often of dubious credibility and 
inappropriate content, while in some cases, cited sources fail outright to contain 
appropriate material for the points they supposedly support (for a critique of specific 
instances of this last case please see Appendix One of this paper).  
In addition to asking questions of some of the criticisms levelled against Fair Trade 
this paper also briefly explores the argument that free trade has proved the best means 
of reducing poverty. Through a more extensive exploration of the academic literature 
this paper questions the idea that China and India uphold the case that ‘free trade 
makes you rich’. Instead, it suggests that these cases more convincingly represent the 
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alternative position that growth is best achieved through the managed interaction of 
local economies with international markets. Closer exploration shows Sidwell’s 
simple methodology of equating correlation with causation seriously wanting. More 
complex qualitative case studies of these countries show that despite slow 
liberalisation, both governments have been heavily involved with the administration 
of their economies.  
This case is further strengthened through the comparative study of possibly the best 
examples of liberal regimes, those of Latin America, and the successful development state 
models in East Asia. Where commitment to liberalisation has been comparatively high, 
countries have not been guaranteed the reward of economic growth that they were 
promised. Even where growth has been achieved, poverty has in fact been seen to rise in 
some cases and commodity producers have certainly been affected for the worst. On the 
other hand, the interventionist regimes of Japan, Taiwan and South Korean have been 
highly successful in both facilitating considerable economic growth and reducing levels 
of poverty. While economic growth can be associated with orthodox policies, these have 
been complimented with a considerable level of unorthodox components and it is this 
policy mix that appears to best account for all these examples of poverty reduction.  
 
The paper further explores the idea that producers should be left to voluntarily seize 
market opportunities and again observes that more in-depth understanding finds the 
position questionable. The literature on micro decision making and specifically that on 
risk management demonstrates that the poor, by definition, often lack the necessary 
capability bundles to carry out diversification. This means that they are often unable to 
carry out decisions rationalised under a given system of market incentives. In addition, 
aversion to further costs and the trepidation likely to surround predictions of success are 
also strong reasons that help explain why the poor do not respond to incentives as theory 
predicts. The final structural problem with Sidwell’s argume nt is that in some cases 
market prices fail to represent wider social benefits of carrying out an activity. This 
means that markets often fail to provide adequate motivation for new enterprise in non-
traditional sectors. It stresses that while this can apply to movement into totally different 
value chains, these barriers are equally applicable to seemingly simpler vertical and 
horizontal diversification.  
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In the light of this understanding, the primary tenants of the Fair Trade framework, (and 
specifically FLO Certification, as administered by the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International) are reinterpreted. It proposes that minimum prices, far from automatically 
retarding diversification as Sidwell suggested, in fact contribute to the facilitation of this 
process. Guaranteed income, long term contracts and credit stabilise the fragile lives of 
southern producers, and give them the time and resources necessary to carry out 
production changes that emerge from incentive systems. 
This alternative approach does not neutralise the need for the Fair Trade movement to 
continue to respond to critique by adopting suitable programs of incremental reform. 
Analysis undertaken for this paper does find sympathy with the argument that 
interminable minimum price regimes might not be the optimal strategy for long term 
sustainable development  (note that this is not the same as arguing that they inherently 
retard efficiency and diversification). However, this response does not contain all the 
conclusions that have come out of our study, and current research in BRASS aims to 
offer a more robust analysis of the potential reforms that have been hinted at. What 
this paper shows is that a more sophisticated understanding of economic theory and 
micro realities goes a long way to questioning the view that Fair Trade is 
‘irrelevant’275 or that free market policies are the best way to reduce poverty.   
A final point for emphasis is that Fair Trade, and indeed any mechanism designed to 
alleviate poverty, should never be treated with a lax attitude to evidence or simplistic 
frames of analysis. More forcefully put, those that seek to influence public policy or 
private behaviour with ill considered approaches are not only likely to be inaccurate , but 
also demonstrate an inappropriate  attitude to issues of great importance. Consumer 
behaviour in the global north directly affects the material existence of those in the south, 
and those that seek to shape this behaviour need to take an appropriately rigorous attitude 
in offering their opinions.  
 
This paper does not strive for a monopoly of truth on the best way to allevia te poverty, 
but has made best efforts to use evidence responsibly in questioning those who claim to 
know the ultimate answer. In this light, this paper does not seek to promote Fair Trade as 
perfect or the only solution to reducing poverty. Liberalisation in both northern and 
                                                 
 
275 Sidwell 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute, p. 11 
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southern markets must play a part, and it should be acknowledge d that a variety of 
certifications and charities can contribute to making this process more beneficial for the 
poor.  
 
Most importantly, it is vital that all the issues presented both in the Adam Smith report 
and this paper are considered critically. Even if more specific conclusions find themselves 
in question, the general point of this paper must stand: ongoing research and evaluation is 
essential to develop our understanding of these issues but will only prove valuable  if 
underpinned by appropriate standards of evidence and framed by developed and nuanced 
interpretation. Reform may well be an important part of a Fair Trade future but what is 
without question is that appropriate research and discussion must form part of tomorrow’s 
agenda.  
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Appendix One 
As stated in the beginning of this paper, one of the most fundamental issues in our 
analysis has been the use of evidence deployed in the Adam Smith Report. As well as 
finding fault with the general standards of evidence employed, it seems enlightening to 
highlight instances where information has been misreferenced. In order to help 
individuals make up their own minds on the strengths of the differing positions, a 
summary of information that appears to have been incorrectly represented can be found 
below.  
 
Page 9 
 
‘“[I]t’s so important that we have one open and rigorous system. If 
people really want to help, then they should buy Fairtrade” 
Harriet Lamb, Director of the Fairtrade Foundation’ 
 
In our opinion this quotation has been misreferenced as it deviates from the conventional 
system of identifying who is responsible for a quoted statement. The method used by 
Sidwell implies that the statement came from Harriet Lamb, the director of the Fairtrade 
Foundation. However, on reading the footnote it is discovered that the statement was in 
fact made by John Kanjagaile (Export Manager, Kagera Co-operative Union, Tanzania). 
Under normal conventions Harriet Lamb’s name should not appear under the statement 
because her only connection is that she used it in her book in a story designed to present 
the opinions of others. 
 
Page 11 
 
‘In practice, then, Fair Trade pays to support relatively wealthy Mexican farmers at the 
expense of poorer nations17’. 
 
The reference 17 then cites, Is Fairtrade coffee a good idea?’, Alex Singleton, 
Globalisation Institute blog, 17/1/2005; Shaping Global Partnerships, FLO International 
Annual Report 2006/07, p. 14. 
 
Checking these references it is discovered that the page from the FLO report is a map 
charting the number of producers certified in each country and the blog by Alex Singleton 
mentions only his theoretical idea that Mexico is a wealthy country and not in need of 
Fair Trade. Nothing in either of these sources backs the argument that Fair Trade makes 
some worse off in Mexico. 
 
 
Page 13 
 
‘According to Oxfam, in the time it takes five hundred people in Guatemala to fill a large 
container with coffee, the same amount of coffee can be picked in Brazil by five people 
and a mechanical harvester. Fairtrade supports inefficient, labour-intensive cooperatives 
in a battle they can never win, trapping them in their poverty 24’. 
 
The citation references the Oxfam report Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup, Oxfam 
International, 2002, p.18. 
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Checking this reference it is discovered that although the citation is placed at the end of 
the second sentence, it is only the previous statement that comes from Oxfam. This is 
misleading as it makes it seem like the opinion expressed in the last line comes from 
Oxfam when in fact it represents the opinion of the author. 
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